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ABSTRACT
ADAPTIVE TRUST AND REPUTATION SYSTEM AS A SECURITY SERVICE
IN GROUP COMMUNICATIONS
by
Pitipatana Sakarindr
Group communications has been facilitating many emerging applications which require
packet delivery from one or more sender(s) to multiple receivers. Owing to the
multicasting and broadcasting nature, group communications are susceptible to various
kinds of attacks. Though a number of proposals have been reported to secure group
communications, provisioning security in group communications remains a critical and
challenging issue.
This work first presents a survey on recent advances in security requirements and
services in group communications in wireless and wired networks, and discusses
challenges in designing secure group communications in these networks. Effective
security services to secure group communications are then proposed. This dissertation
also introduces the taxonomy of security services, which can be applied to secure group
communications, and evaluates existing secure group communications schemes.
This dissertation work analyzes a number of vulnerabilities against trust and
reputation systems, and proposes a threat model to predict attack behaviors. This work
also considers scenarios in which multiple attacking agents actively and collaboratively
attack the whole network as well as a specific individual node. The behaviors may be
related to both performance issues and security issues. Finally, this work extensively
examines and substantiates the security of the proposed trust and reputation system.

This work next discusses the proposed trust and reputation system for an
anonymous network, referred to as the Adaptive Trust-based Anonymous Network
(ATAN). The distributed and decentralized network management in ATAN does not
require a central authority so that ATAN alleviates the problem of a single point of
failure. In ATAN, the trust and reputation system aims to enhance anonymity by
establishing a trust and reputation relationship between the source and the forwarding
members. The trust and reputation relationship of any two nodes is adaptive to new
information learned by these two nodes or recommended from other trust nodes.
Therefore, packets are anonymously routed from the 'trusted' source to the destination
through 'trusted' intermediate nodes, thereby improving anonymity of communications.
In the performance analysis, the ratio of the ATAN header and data payload is around
0.1, which is relatively small.
This dissertation offers analysis on security services on group communications. It
illustrates that these security services are needed to incorporate with each other such that
group communications can be secure. Furthermore, the adaptive trust and reputation
system is proposed to integrate the concept of trust and reputation into communications.
Although deploying the trust and reputation system incurs some overheads in terms of
storage spaces, bandwidth and computation cycles, it shows a very promising
performance that enhance users' confidence in using group communications, and
concludes that the trust and reputation system should be deployed as another layer of
security services to protect group communications against malicious adversaries and
attacks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Information
Group communications refers to either point-to-multipoint or multipoint-to-multipoint
communications via some underlying networking infrastructure such as VPN and IP
multicast networks. Group communications in wired networks has been facilitating many
emerging applications which require packet delivery from one or more sender(s) to
multiple receivers. There are increasingly high demands of security on group
communications such as authentication, authorization, and privacy. Though a number of
proposals on secure group communication systems (GCSs) have been reported,
provisioning security in group communications remains a critical and challenging
networking issue. Owing to insecure wireless channels, group communications are
susceptible to various kinds of attacks. Though a number of proposals have been reported
to secure group communications, provisioning security in group communications in
wireless networks remains a critical and challenging issue.

1.2 Objectives
Two objectives of this dissertation are to expand the utilization of elliptic curve
cryptosystem (ECC) into GKM to make the key management in GKM more efficient, and
to deploy trust and reputation to enhance security services in group communications
systems.

1

2
1.3 Organization
This dissertation is comprised of three parts. The first part includes Chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 2 presents a survey on recent advances in security requirements and services and
challenges in many group communications systems [1]. Chapter 3 presents a survey on
recent advances in security requirements and services and challenges in three different
wireless network types: wireless infrastructure networks, mobile ad hoc networks, and
wireless sensor networks [2]. Chapter 4 introduces the trust and reputation system with
two objectives: to propose the resilient trust and reputation system that can be
implemented in different network environments; to analyze security concerns in many
aspects including an attack classification, an illustration of attack scenarios, and an
introduction of defense mechanisms responding dependently on every attack scenarios.
The second part expands the utilization of elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) into
GKM to decrease the key length while providing securities at the same level as that of
other cryptosystems, and proposes the cluster scheme to make the key management
more efficient, which is discussed in Chapter 5 [3]. This chapter utilizes the elliptic
curve cryptosystem for group key management such that the group key is securely
selected, rekeyed, and distributed in group communications with a shorter key length
but provides the same security level as that of other cryptosystems. Afterward, this
chapter deploys the cluster scheme to decrease the processing time and key
computations.
The third part presents a novel adaptive trust-based anonymous network (ATAN),
which is discussed in Chapter 6 [4]. In ATAN, the trust and reputation model aims to
enhance anonymity and security in GCS by establishing a trust and reputation
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relationship between the source and the forwarding members. The trust and reputation
relationship is adaptive to new information learned by these two nodes or recommended
from other trust nodes. Therefore, packets are anonymously routed from the "trusted"
source to the destination through "trusted" intermediate nodes. Finally, Chapter 7 draws
conclusive remarks and discusses future work.

CHAPTER 2
SECURITY SERVICES ON GROUP COMMUNICATIONS

2.1

ective
Objective

Securing group communications has attracted much attention as group-oriented
communications has been increasingly facilitating many emerging applications which
require packet delivery from one or more sender(s) to multiple receivers. Overall,
security remains a critical and challenging networking issue in group communications.
Different security services may be needed to satisfy different security requirements from
various applications. The most fundamental component of security services is the
cryptographic material, such as keys. Of all proposals reported, most have focused on
addressing the issue of key management to secure group communication systems.
However, any secure group communications system should offer as many security
services as they can. This chapter presents a survey on recent advances in several security
requirements and security services in many group communications systems, and
challenges in designing a secure group communications system.

2.2

Introduction

Group communications refers to either point-to-multipoint or multipoint-to-multipoint
communications via some underlying networking infrastructures. This chapter does not
specify the underlying networking infrastructures to support group communications
systems (GCSs) since there are currently no concrete works or standards on those
networks to effectively secure group communications. However, the ongoing activities of
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the IETF Multicast Security Charter work group (IETF MSEC WG) standardize the
multicast security framework and architectures for IP-based multicast networks.
Owing to the distributed nature of group communications, it is difficult to ensure
the basic security desires: only authenticated senders can transmit authenticated and
protected message; only authorized receivers receive a meaningful message; and all
activities can be partially or fully accounted for. Different security services may be
needed to satisfy different security requirements for different applications. The most
fundamental component of security services is the cryptographic material, such as keys.
Inherently, the performance of security services fundamentally relies on the strength and
security of the cryptographic material. Many proposals developed so far to secure group
communication systems have focused on solving the issue of key management. However,
any secure group communications system should offer as much security services as they
could. This chapter provides extensive investigation into six security services, including
group key management, group access control, group anonymity, group signature, and
secures routing, so that readers can understand broader issues on secure group
communications, as depicted in Figure 2.1.

6

Figure 2.1 Security services in provisioning secure group communications [1].

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, security requirements in
group communications are discussed, followed by various known attacks targeting group
communication systems. Then, corresponding security services proposed in some
outstanding GCSs along with attributes for evaluating each service and a comparison of
these attributes are presented. Some existing group-oriented applications that are
deployed in several networks are later illustrated. Finally, the future challenges and the
summary of this chapter are discussed.

2.3 Known Attacks in Group Communication Systems (GCSs)
Some attacks have been discussed in many researches on providing security to grouporiented systems [5]. Some of most known attacks are classified based on three attack
perspectives: whether the attack is passive or active; whether the attack targets on data or

7

control messages; and whether the attack mainly aims at group members or group
controllers. The passive attacker passively intercepts messages or keeps track of
communications. The active attacker modifies, injects or drops messages.
There are some known attacks that effectively compromise security of group
communications as illustrated according to the attack attributes depicted in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Some Known Attacks on Group Communications Based on Three Attack
Attributes [1]

Denial of Service attack — An attacker sends out a large number of packets to
exhaust resources and operations at the multicast routers or group controlling entities
such as a key server and a group manager. The attacker may join in the multicast group
and later interrupts the group operations, e.g., joining and rekeying processes. This results
in denial of service to other users.
Collusion attack — A group of attackers can collude to attack the victim or to
collect and exchange group-related information in order to instigate other attacks on the
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victim, such as severe group exploitation, a masquerade of a legitimate member, and an
illegal transmission of messages on behalf of other members.
Traffic analysis attack — An attacker correlates all incoming and outgoing packets
at a forwarding entity to execute the traffic analysis on messages. The analysis may
examine the message length, the message pattern or coding, and the duration of the
message stayed in each group entity. The attacker may identify a possible sender or
receiver, or determine the sending and receiving ends of communications.
Replay attack — An attacker repeatedly sends a large number of packets, which
have been previously transmitted, to consume tremendous amount of bandwidth or to
exhaust the victim's queues, resulting in dropping of other messages.
Cut-and-Paste attack — An attacker replaces the whole portion of encrypted data
with its own false data, but leaves other non-encrypted portions (e.g., header portions)
untouched. Thus, the attacker does not need to possess the decryption key but is still able
to fabricate the message.
Routing attack — An attacker can execute attacks in various means such as
targeting the routing infrastructures, exploiting the routing protocols, and fabricating the
routing update messages. The consequences could be as follows: some multicast routers
are isolated; group messages are routed in loop and then dropped after the Time-To-Live
(TTL) expires; group messages are falsely forwarded to unauthorized attackers; blackhole
routing; and an unauthorized addition into the routing table.
Impersonate attack — Regardless of how an attacker obtains the victim's identity,
the attacker impersonates that group member to launch some attacks or carries out a theft
of service on behalf of the victim.
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Byzantine attack — An attacker is perverted and sends out multiple group
messages to different subsets of other group members but maliciously claims that these
messages are the same. Thus, the victim creates the wrong message sequence which may
allow the attacker to corrupt the victim's machine or to create a backdoor in the victim's
machine for future control.
Member serialization attack — Most contributory group key agreement protocols
generate the shared group key in a serial order. An attacker targets a single participating
member and effectively disrupts the key generation and rekeying processes.

2.4 Security Requirements for Group Communication Systems
This section describes commonly known security requirements for group
communications, and security services that meet these requirements are later elicited in
the subsequent section.
Group authentication: It enables a group member to be authenticated as
unspecified, but legitimate such that the sending member can multicast a message on
behalf of the group without revealing its identity during the verification process
performed by the receiver. Besides user authentication, message authentication allows
any group message to be verified of its authenticity.
Group authorization and access control: Every member may be assigned the same
or different permissions and restrictions for accessing group resources. The accesscontrolling entity can verify a member's request to access specified resources by using
several means such as the access control list (ACL) and access hierarchy.
Group accountability and non-repudiation: All group operations should be
accountable, implying that any group operation performed and resources utilized can be
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tracked and recorded in order to detect any abusing usages of resources and operations. A
non-repudiation requirement ensures that the identity of a member whose activities are in
dispute can be fully and precisely identified by the designated entity.
Group privacy and anonymity: Fundamentally, group privacy and anonymity
contradict to group accountability and non-repudiation because the privacy of a malicious
group member should be stripped off and its identity should be exposed. There have been
some researches trying to determine the trade-offs between these requirements. For
example, some threshold sharing mechanisms may allow a number of designated entities
to gather information and to re-create some secret elements used to ultimately identify the
wrong-doing members.
Group message integrity and confidentiality: Message integrity should be
preserved by ensuring that the message has not been added or deleted or modified by any
unauthorized entity, either unauthorized members or outsiders. In GCSs, the integrity is
ensured by encrypting a group message with a single shared key, called a group key.
Thus, the message protection mainly relies on the cryptographic strength of the group
key. Confidentiality ensures that only the authorized can retrieve meaningful data from
the message.
Group Survivability and Availability: An attacker may attack multicast routers
and other routing infrastructures or target a joining operation in order to cut off some or
all group members or disrupt group communications, causing service unavailability. To
achieve group survivability, the routing protocol should ensure that any member can still
be connected even under attacks. Furthermore, there should be some preventive

11
mechanisms to support group survivability by rediscovering connections in the events of
link or node failures.

2.5

Performance Attributes to Evaluate Secure Group Communication Systems

In order to evaluate and compare different SGC systems, one needs to construct
evaluation attributes to fairly analyze and determine the performance and security
analysis of each SGC system. In this chapter, evaluation attributes are listed and grouped
into two types: fundamental attributes used to evaluate mechanisms in providing one or
more security services to GCSs; and specific attributes used as additional properties
corresponding to those supported security services.

2.5.1 Fundamental Attributes
The fundamental attributes for a SGC system include the following as depicted in Figure
2.2.
•

Type of group management. The group may be established and managed by three
approaches: centralized (with a central authority), partially distributed (with a
group of designated controllers), and fully distributed (without any explicitly
designated controller). The group controller may perform the group initiation and
termination, the membership admission, the group material generation, and the
distribution of some controlling messages. The group controller may also act as a
key server, if given the capacity.

•

Overheads. In general, three types of overheads are incurred by all network
operations: storage, communications, and processing. For storage overheads, a
group controller and a group member may require different spaces of memory to
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store group information such as session and group keys, list of group members,
cryptography materials, and other service-related materials. For communications
overheads, the characteristics of group communications likely incur additional
communications messages. For example, dynamic group membership changes
cause members to reorganize group operations (i.e., sending joining or leaving
notifications, selecting new group controllers) and to rekey all related keys to
ensure key secrecy (i.e., distribution of new keys). To process overheads, each
group operation requires computation which can be measured in terms of the
number of processing steps (iterations), processing duration, and complexity
bound. The key generation and distribution, rekeying, and message encryption/
decryption/ digestion/ signing processes are computationally expensive.
•

Scalability. The performance should not be degraded drastically as the group size
increases and should be linear with the group size when implemented with a small
or large group of members. In addition, the scalability may be increased in many
following scenarios: for example, a group is managed in a distributed approach
(due to easiness to expand the group).

•

Dynamic membership. Group communications systems should be able to handle a
membership change (i.e., any individual member leaves or joins the group at any
time) without significant system performance degradation. Some systems may
treat group merging and partitioning the same way as a bulk of individual
membership changes, and may thus suffer degraded performance when handling a
large group of membership changes. Different networks may require different
ways to handle the group membership changes. For examples, wireless ad hoc
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networks may observe higher mobility of members (more frequent membership
changes) while multicast wired networks may expect less or even fixed mobility
(less frequent membership changes).
•

Trust relationship. Some systems require a trusted third party such as the
certificate-issuing authority and the key server, which can make the trusted third
entity a point of attack. Some systems assume trust relations among group
controllers or between a group controller and members, but ignore the need for
additional security mechanisms to protect trust operations such as trust
establishment and updating trust relations. The security and performance analysis
should take into consideration of such assumptions and reflect the actual effects of
using trust relations in a SGC system.

•

Resilience. It is necessary to include a threat model and the security analysis in
designing and evaluating a SGC system. To analyze the threat model and security
analysis, both network-based attacks and service-related attacks should be
considered. The network-based attacks are general attacks that explore the
vulnerabilities of a network. The service-related attacks specifically target the
security service mechanisms originally deployed to satisfy some security
requirements. For example, a group signature satisfies privacy and authentication,
but unintentionally leaves the SGC system with new vulnerabilities, such as
weaknesses in the signature algorithm or erred source codes of software
generating the signatures. The security analysis may be able to detect and prevent
such vulnerabilities.
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• Control channels. Some systems require some off-line communications channels,
such as using a telephone. Other systems may require control channels that are
usually assumed to be secure and not restricted to a limited bandwidth resource.
The performance and security analysis should measure on-line impacts of the offline channel.

Figure 2.2 Fundamental attributes for evaluating performance and security in a SGC
system [1].
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2.5.2 Service-specified Attributes
Additional properties or attributes for specific security services may be discussed
separately as follows as depicted in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 Service-specified attributes for evaluating security services in a SGC system

1 Group Key Management. Six additional properties are related to a group key
management scheme as follows.
• Type of key management. In a centralized key management, a key manager
generates the keys, distributes them to associated members, and maintains all the
keys. The security of key generation is strong, but the key manager carries most
of the workload and becomes the attack target. In a partially distributed key
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management, a set of key managers generate the keys and distribute them to all
group members. Thus, each key manager has a reduced workload. Still, it is a
point of target and the security of key generation is weakened. In a contributory
key management, each member randomly selects its contribution, exchanges
within a group, and generates a shared group key without a central key
server/manager. The security of key selection and generation is low, but there is
no need for a key manager. All members equally share the workloads.
• Type of underlying cryptosystems. Various cryptosystems can be deployed for
encryption, decryption, and digestion, such as RSA, DL, and ECC, which
determine the cryptographic strength of keys.
• Key secrecies. There are three aspects of key secrecies: forward secrecy,
backward secrecy, and perfect forward secrecy. The forward secrecy ensures that
a new joining member cannot use the new key to decrypt all messages which have
been encrypted with the previous key(s). The backward secrecy ensures that a
leaving member cannot use the previous key(s) to decrypt all messages encrypted
with the new key. The perfect forward secrecy ensures that a compromise of a
long-term key seed which generates the present short-term key(s) cannot deprive
the secrecy of other previous short-term keys which have been generated by the
compromised long-term key.
• Key independence. A disclosure of a subset of session keys cannot deprive the
secrecy of other subsets of session keys which have been generated by the same
long-term key seed.
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•

Key serialization. The key materials are selected and the group key is generated
by members in an ordered sequence. An attack on any participating member
disrupts the whole process. Instead, some schemes may construct the key by other
means, i.e., broadcasting the key materials or establishing a key tree, at the
expense of overheads.

•

Rekeying. There are several factors in evaluating rekeying as follows. The
number of rekey messages—the number of distributed and received messages per
member or per key manager may be different. The length of rekey
messages—some protocols aggregate multiple rekey messages into a single
message, which in return increases the consumed bandwidth for one transmission.
Thus, the performance analysis should also determine the bandwidth consumption
per message in addition to the number of transmitted messages. The rekeying
process--the rekeying operation should reduce or optimize the computation and
time complexity of the rekeying operation with respect to the group size.
Triggering conditions—there are three scenarios: first (membership changes
based rekeying), keys associated with the membership changes must be rekeyed
to ensure the key secrecy for the remaining members; second (periodic rekeying),
the rekeying operation is invoked periodically to prevent keys from being
compromised over time; and third (specified rekeying), a system enables the
rekeying operation for specified incidents, such as upon detection of attacks or
violations.
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2 Group Authentication. Two additional properties are related to a group authentication
scheme as follows.
•

User authentication. Users should be authenticated upon joining the group,
signing the messages, or accessing group materials.

•

Message authentication. The system requires a sender to sign a message and a
receiver to authenticate the received message for its authenticity and integrity.

3 Group Access Control. This chapter considers two additional properties related to a
group access control scheme as follows.
•

Access control. The group resources and group messages should be accessible
only to authorized members.

•

Dynamic access control. A system enables the member to dynamically change its
request to access resources. Consequently, the system must be able to update
access permissions and restrictions with additional mechanisms when the
member's access privilege changes.

4 Group Non-repudiation. Three additional properties related to a group nonrepudiation scheme are discussed as follows.
•

Message signature. A system requires messages to be signed with a membership
certificate to identify the originator (signer) of the message.

•

Timestamp or sequence number. Timestamps and/or sequence numbers can be
used to limit the validation of a certificate or message signature, and to prevent
replay attacks.

•

Revocation of certificates. The expired certificate or misuse of certificate is
revoked by the issuer and may be publicly announced in the revocation list. Some
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systems may keep the expired certificates for future verification at the expense of
storage overhead.
•

Characteristics of signature. There are four basic requirements of a digital
signature: unforgeable—a group of colluded attackers cannot generate a group
signature identical to that generated by a legitimate member; non-allegeable—a
group of colluded attackers cannot generate a group signature by which a group
controller falsely identifies a legitimate member as an attacker; linkable—a group
of colluded attackers cannot generate a valid group signature by which a group
controller cannot identify the identity of any of these attackers; secretive—a
member's secret elements can neither be retrieved from a group signature nor
from any part of it.

5 Group Privacy and Anonymity. Two additional properties related to a group privacy
and anonymity scheme are discussed as follows.
•

Unlinkability of anonymous communications. There are three anonymities: sender
anonymity—a sender shall not be linked to its sent message to prevent attackers
from learning of the message's origin; receiver anonymity—a receiver shall not
be linked to the received message to prevent attackers from learning of the
message's destination; and sender-receiver anonymity—the sender and receiver
shall not be linked together and they are also relatively anonymous to each other.

•

Type of management. There are two types in this subcategory: centralized
management—a system relays messages through a trusted anonymous entity to
hide identities of the sender and receiver; and distributed management—a system
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relays messages through a group of anonymous entities or hides the identities by
other means such as encapsulating messages and coding with the XOR operation.
6 Secure Routing. Two additional properties related to a secure routing scheme are
considered.
•

Management. A system can establish and maintain routing-related information in
a centralized or distributed manner.

•

Prevention. Updating routing information must be restricted to authorized
members. A new routing path should be tested to prevent routing black hole and
loopholes. Any request to join/add/update the routing table and other routingrelated information should be authenticated and authorized.

Then, based on properties shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the comparison results of
these outstanding secure GCSs are presented in the following section, as summarized in
Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The shaded box in Table 2.3 indicates that the security services are
irrelevant to the systems and are excluded. Additionally, Table 2.3 notes that 1) N/A
stands for "not applicable" or "no available information," and 2) if a system design does
not offer some security services, the corresponding table cells of these security services
are emptied and shaded.

2.6

Security Services for Group Communication Systems

This section discusses essential security services that meet security requirements
mentioned before. Many concepts and existing solutions have been proposed to provide
such services, but only a few promising concepts and solutions are highlighted here.
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2.6.1 Group Key Management (GKM)
Any GKM scheme should exhibit the following properties: the key generation and
rekeying should be provably secure; an imitation of the group key should be infeasible or
computationally difficult; the group key is securely distributed and only the legitimate
users can obtain a valid group key; and a revocation of the group key upon a membership
change should be immediately notified.
Waldvogel et al. [6] proposed the VersaKey framework that organizes the key
space to reduce the complexity. The framework consists of three approaches (centralized
tree-based approach, and centralized and distributed flat table-based approaches) that
support both centralized and fully distributed SGC environments. The centralized tree
approach manages all keys by means of a hierarchical key tree. In flat-type approaches,
the key tree is flattened into a table that stores all keys, each of which is indexed by some
binary bits of the member's identification. In addition, the transitions among these
approaches on-the-fly are presented. It was shown that the key management has a
computational complexity of O(logN), where N is the group's size.
Banerjee and Bhattacharjee [7] proposed a management scheme based on a
clustering protocol and a hierarchy of keys. All members are divided into several clusters
in a layer. In each cluster, a cluster header will be selected and be a cluster member of the
upper layer. This process is repeated until there is only one cluster member in the top
layer. The clustering protocol is deployed to cluster the members in each layer such that
when a membership changes, only one cluster in each layer requires its associated keys to
be updated. It was demonstrated that, for an individual membership change, the
overheads incurred by group members are constant with respect to the group size. In
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addition, for a bulk membership change, the processing and communication overheads at
the key server is logarithmic with respect to the group size.
Wong et al. [8] introduced three key graphs-based rekeying approaches (user-,
key-, and group-oriented) to mitigate the scalability problem. In events of membership
changes, three rekeying approaches operate as follows: for user-oriented rekeying, the
key server generates new keys for each affected member and encrypts them with keys
previously held by that member; for key-oriented rekeying, the new keys are encrypted
individually with previous keys at the same key nodes of the key tree and multicast in
multiple rekey messages; and for group-oriented rekeying, it is similar to the key-oriented
rekeying except that all new keys are put together in a single rekey message. Simulation
results demonstrated that the complexities of rekeying overheads of the three approaches
are linear with the logarithm of the group size. In addition, the group-oriented approach
performs the best from the perspective of the key server while the user-oriented approach
has the best performance from the perspective of the group member.
Amir et al. [9] secured group communications with a secure service by using the
proposed robust and contributory key agreement protocol and the virtual synchrony
semantics. The proposed protocol enhances the group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) key
agreement in two main incidents: first, it can mitigate the member serialization problem
which requires the group key to be constructed or rekeyed in a serial ordering; second, it
incorporates a membership protocol such that it is aware of any membership changes
during the key generation and rekeying processes. In addition, the proposed protocol can
effectively handle events of members joining and leaving within a very short time
interval. Their simulated system, called Secure Spread, demonstrated the reduction of
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time used to successfully establish a secure group and generate a group key after a
membership change.
2.6.2 Group Access Control

In group-oriented networks, group members can be assigned with multiple access
privileges. The data stream can be accessed with different access privileges such that only
members who have an appropriate privilege can access corresponding portions of
contents of the data stream (or some data streams of the aggregated data stream). This is
referred to as multiple access privilege. In addition, some GCSs can support dynamic
access control.
Sun and Liu [10] proposed a multi-group (MG) key management scheme to
construct the logical key graph by integrating key trees of all members. Each authorized
member holds a set of keys associated with the nodes from the leaf node to the root node
in the key graph. The access privilege for each member is determined by the beheld set of
keys. The scheme can provide forward and backward secrecies when a member changes
its access privileges (or leaves the group) because the set of keys and resources associated
with that member are re-assigned (or withdrawn). It was shown that overheads caused by
the rekeying incidents are greatly reduced. In addition, the scalability and complexity of
the scheme is improved.
Zhang and Wang [11] proposed a hierarchical access control (HAC) key
management scheme, where a key server maintains the description of relations of
memberships and resources in the form of unified hierarchy. Instead of classifying
members with different resource requirements into multi groups as of the conventional
multi-group (MG) key management scheme, the HAC scheme constructs a membership-
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group subgraph and a resource-group subgraph, and combines them into a single unified
logical key graph that determines which resource the specified member can access.
Simulation results have demonstrated that, with the HAC scheme, the storage and
rekeying overheads at every member and the key server can be significantly reduced by
at least 20% as compared to those of the MG scheme.

2.6.3 Group Signature
The group signature is used to authenticate the source whether the message is sent from
the signer who is a legitimate, but unidentified, group member and to authenticate the
message whether it has been altered during transmission. In case of a dispute, the third
trusted party or the group controller can identify the actual signer of the signed message.
Chen et al. [12] proposed a scheme that combines a provably secure scheme and
identification (ID)-based scheme to provide authentication, anonymity, and nonrepudiation. Unlike the original ID-based signature scheme, the proposed scheme
generates a member's public key from its identity information (e.g., email address, name,
network address, etc.). As an advantage of the scheme, the group controller uses the
smaller ID rather than the larger public key, as used by a public key infrastructure-based
scheme, to generate a member's private key in order to reduce the storage overhead. A
member signs the message with its private key on behalf of the group.
Lee [13] proposed a threshold signature scheme with multiple signing policies.
The scheme enables the group signature-generating functionality to be shared among at
least any t members out of n members, so that a threshold value of the signature is t. Any
t-1 or lower members cannot generate or reconstruct the same signature with the
threshold value of t. This proposed scheme demonstrated that each user stores only a
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group secret key (called a public shadow), thereby significantly reducing the storage and
communication overheads for group signature generation.
Ateniese et al. [14] proposed a provably secure group signature scheme and a
modified identity escrow scheme. The proposed scheme enables a group member to
authenticate the new corners by using the zero knowledge proof method before issuing a
membership certificate. In addition, the scheme allows group members to perform group
signing by showing the proof of knowledge of their certificates. Using a modified identity
escrow scheme, the receiver does not know of the signer's identity but is guaranteed by
the third trusted verifier that the signer's signature can be opened and linked to the signer.
Thus, a signer does not expose its secret to the verifier during the verification process.
Furthermore, the scheme is provably coalition-resistant against an adaptive attacker who
can adaptively run the joining process as multiple new members in order to obtain
sufficient information to generate valid group certificates.

2.6.4 Group Anonymity
Many articles proposed solutions to provide anonymity in unicast communications, but
those solutions may not be suitable to group communications in the following ways: 1) a
node has to hide from multiple nodes; 2) group membership management becomes
challenging for providing anonymity; 3) a much complicated group key management is
needed to anonymously generate, distribute, and manage multiple keys, including the
group key and other key-protected keys, so that anonymity in group communications can
be possibly pursued. The following schemes attempt to provide anonymity in group
communications:

26
Xiao et al. [15] proposed the mutual anonymous multicast (MAM) protocol that
allows communications among three types of nodes: anonymous member (AM), nonanonymous member (NM), and middle outsider (MO) nodes. Initially, a set of NM nodes
form the anonymous multicast tree. Then, an AM node sets up connections with three
possible choices: NM nodes on the tree that can still accommodate connections — called
unsaturated NM nodes, unsaturated AM nodes on the tree, and MO nodes that are invited
to join the tree. The protocol combines the well-known reverse Onion protocol [16] and
Crowd protocol [17] in the following ways. Each AM node creates a remailer as a list of
intermediate nodes whose identities are encrypted with their associated public keys in
layers, similar to layers of an onion. The NM nodes on the tree keep all remailers
associated with a particular AM node. The packet originated from or destined to an AM
node will be forwarded through the remailer associated with this AM node. For the AMto-NM connections, an intermediate node chooses either to deliver the packet directly to
the NM node or randomly forward the packet to another node, according to the
predefined forwarding probability. For the AM-to-AM connections (mutual anonymous
connections), the AM 1 node will select one of its middle nodes to establish a connection
with one of AM 2's middle nodes.
Grosch [18] provided both sender and receiver anonymity to multicast traffics
through both dedicated and shared anonymisers. The anonymiser receives messages from
a sender, processes the messages (for the purposes of integrity, confidentiality, and
anonymity), and forwards them as its own messages to receivers via a secured multicast
channel. The scheme determines the location of the anonymiser on the multicast tree in
such a way that the network loads and average distance (i.e., the average number of links)
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2.6.5 Secure Routing
In this service, the IP-based multicast network is mainly considered. A single packet is
delivered through multicast routers to a large group of receivers. If an attacker can join a
multicast group and launches either passive or active attacks, these attacks would
effectively incur high overheads and network-wide failures and unavailability.
Unfortunately, many GCSs assume that the group routing structure (e.g., multicast tree) is
secure and unauthorized users neither send nor receive the messages. However, a few
secure group routing schemes have been proposed to safeguard the routing infrastructures
physically and logically.
Shields and Aceves [20] proposed a keyed hierarchical multicast routing protocol
(KHIP) that allows only authorized and trusted members with proper privileges to access
and update the multicast tree, thus preventing unauthorized users from joining or
expanding the multicast tree. Data messages are protected with random encryption keys
and branch keys, but there is no shared group key for the entire multicast group. A
member who serves as the core for each branch reprocesses all passing messages as their
origin before forwarding them to the parent and children branches of the multicast tree. It
was demonstrated that a minimal number of nonces are added to the headers of data and
routing updated messages to prevent the replay attack and the forgery attack.
Furthermore, the impact of denial-of-service attacks undertaken by untrusted members
(e.g., untrusted multicast routers) could be minimized.
Shim [21] introduced a secure multicast routing protocol based on intra-domain
and inter-domain routing protocols. The network is divided into domains, each managed
by a core router, and all controlling messages associated with the domain are encrypted
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from the anonymiser to all receivers can be optimized. To find such an optimal location,
the scheme first selects a candidate node in the undirected graph. Then, it assigns the
weight of each link on the graph as the number of all receivers that are connected
downstream. Based on the link weights, the shortest paths from the candidate node to all
receiving nodes are determined, and the multicast tree is formed. To reduce the network
load, all nodes can be grouped in a smaller group size, although fewer nodes can then be
selected as anonymisers. Given the specified pair of the candidate node and group size
value, the scheme calculates the overall weight for this multicast tree as the sum, over all
links, of the probability that each link is used. Repeat the process for all combination of
candidate nodes and group size values. The node with the lowest overall weight is
selected as the anonymiser.
Dolev and Ostrovsky [19] proposed the XOR tree-based scheme to provide
efficient anonymous multicast (either sender anonymity or receiver anonymity or both)
and to protect the multicast network against the traffic analysis and collusion attacks. The
idea is that a forwarding member performs an XOR operation bit-by-bit on data stream
forwarded to its predecessor with pseudo-random stream in order to hide the true bits of
the data stream. It is analytically demonstrated that the communication overhead on each
link and the computational overhead incurred at any member on the forwarding path is
greatly reduced.
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with a domain control key. All domains are managed by the center router in a hierarchical
tree manner. A non-member user is only able to send data messages encrypted with its
corresponding sender specific key. All members use the shared group data key to encrypt
and decrypt data messages sent by members and the sender specific key (SSK) to decrypt
data messages sent by an associated non-member user. The protocol is claimed to achieve
scalability and prevent several active and passive attacks, including unauthorized joining
the routing multicast tree.

2.7 Group Communications-oriented Networks
This section reviews some SGC frameworks which have been implemented on several
existing networks, including multi-agent systems (MASS), personal area networks
(PANs), and IP multicast networks.

2.7.1 Multi-Agent System
MAS fundamentally consists of three components: agents, hosts, and
controllers/coordinators. An agent can be a software code that runs on a host, operates in
an autonomous manner, interacts with other agents, and connects to one or multiple agent
coordinators. MAS is agent-based, implying that security services must be provided to
end-to-end communications at the agent level, not the host level. Keys and other grouprelated resource and information are usually stored in agents, and protected from hosts on
which these agents operate
Li and Lan [22] proposed a mobile agent system operating through a secure and
high performance agent-based multicast network. The proposed solution adopts the
concept of multicast by supporting communications between an agent coordinator and an
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agent on a host or communications among agents at the agent level. The security solution
uses two keys: a group key and a secret key. The centralized agent coordinator generates
a secret key that is then cryptographically separated into secret key shadows, each shared
individually by an agent. The key management is based on the concept of (k, n) threshold
secrecy, by which the secret is shared among n agents and, to reveal the secret, the shares
must be obtained from at least k agents. The secret key shadows are used to derive the
group key. The group key and secret key shadows are protected from the resided hosts.
The coordinator can evict any agent and takes charge of rekeying by excluding the secret
key shadow of the evicted agent from the original secret key. The existing agents can
correctly compute the new group key while the evicted agent cannot.
Pros: Key secrecies are provided. Security and performance analysis of the
proposed solutions are shown. The scheme was claimed to have reduced communications
and processing overheads without solid proofs.
Cons: The scheme requires a priori embedment of the secret key shadow in the
agent, and the scheme makes a weak assumption that an agent is well protected via
cryptographic means and that each agent is trusted.

2.7.2 Personal Area Network

PAN communications is enabled by either wired technologies (i.e., USB and Firewire) or
wireless technologies (i.e., Bluetooth, Infrared, and Wi-Fi) or a combination of both. In
PANs, devices can communicate to each other and form the network around the person.
Data can be passed through from one device to others or conveyed to other networks.
Data can be encrypted by using a group key that is shared by all devices. The number of
nodes is generally not large, and most devices are operated by one person. With such
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characteristics, the central authority can be most effective in key management, and
membership changes may not be frequent.
Shin et al. [23] proposed a framework consisting of key exchanged protocols
against a compromised insider device: Leakage-Resilient and Forward-Secure
Authenticated Key Exchanges 1 and 2 (LRFS-AKE1 and LRFS-AKE2). The proposed
protocols require a centralized server, which exchanges two long-term secret elements
with a user: one for authentication (called the verification data), and another for securing
its pair-wise communication (called the symmetric key). The group key generation and
distribution is executed in three phases. In the first phase, following the LRFS-AKE1, the
server and a user verify themselves by using the verification data, i.e., a combination of a
random number and the user's password, along with the symmetric key and the list of
devices. Subsequently, a pair-wise session key is generated individually for each device.
In the second phase, following LRFS-AKE2, each device performs a contributory group
key generation in an orderly manner, assisted by the server but without a user interaction.
The session key is used to secure the distribution of its contributed key portion. In the
third phase, the same group session key is generated independently by each user.
Pros: Threat models are discussed; proposed protocols are suitable for PANs.
Cons: No rekeying mechanism exists; group key secrecy is not fully guaranteed
due to the same password being used by the same user; a symmetric key is assumed to be
done off line; additional user password is required; a centralized server is ignorantly
assumed as trusted; and no membership change protocol exists.
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2.7.3 Multicast Security in IP Multicast Networks
Since 2000, the IETF MSEC working group aims to standardize secure group
communication protocols over internets with at least three security objectives [24]: first,
providing fundamental security services, such as group key management, access control,
group authorization, group policy management, and user and message authentication;
second, extending operability from centralized networks to distributed networks where
multiple trusted entities are deployed throughout networks; third, defending against
network-based attacks.
Currently, IETF MSEC WG has published many Request For Comments (RFCs)
in three sets of documents, as in [24], as follows: first, a set of fundamental basics of
multicast security, such as security requirements and interpretations (RFC 3547) and
multicast security architecture (RFC 3740); second, a set of architectures, such as group
key management architecture (RFC 4046) and group policy management architecture
(first mentioned in RFC 3740); third, a set of protocols that implement each separated
solution of the multicast security, such as source authentication (RFC 4082), group key
management (RFC 4535), group security policy token (RFC 4534), and multicast
extensions to IP Sec (RFC 5374).
Chaddoud and Varadharajan [25] proposed a secure source-specific multicast
communications (S-SSM) architecture that offers two security services: access control
and data integrity for commercial content delivery. It operates by using the protocol
independent multicast-SSM (PIM-SSM) routers which form the backbone. S-SSM
divides the whole service area into domains and has two layers of controls: the domainwide level via local controllers, and the network-wide level via a global controller. The
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global controller and content distribution server are connected directly to the PIM-SSM
routers. The global controller manages data distribution, authorizes user access, generates
channel keys, and authorizes rekeying. To manage subscribers, the Internet group
management protocol (IGMP) version 3 is deployed in some PIM-SSM routers, which
are located outside the backbone and connect directly to subscribers. In the
IGMPv3/PIM-SMM routers, the local controller functionality is added to authenticate
new subscribers, to distribute a channel key to subscribers, and to periodically rekey the
channel key as authorized by the group controller.
Pros: Computation overhead is roughly analyzed based on the number of
computing operations; group key management, access control, traffic confidentiality and
integrity, and authentication services are offered; and dynamic membership is supported.
Cons: There is insufficient information about communication and computation
overheads, and security analysis to substantiate the claim that the proposed scheme is
very inefficient; and some communications on the off-line channel may be required.

2.8 Challenging Factors in Designing Secure GCSs
As illustrated in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, there is no unique scheme or system that can achieve
all security requirements. Here, various perspectives and attributes in designing a secure
and high performance GCS will be summarized shortly.

2.8.1 Environment and System Performance
From the perspective of group management, a central group controller (and, in some
systems, a key server) in a centralized GCS can afford intensive computations and
storage overhead but, in return, becomes the point of attack which threatens to shutdown
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all group operations. The other upsides are that high security can be achieved effectively
and quickly, and each group member sustains less workload. A decentralized GCS
reduces the workload performed by each sub-group controller. The apparent downsides
include an additional communication overhead caused by communications among subgroup controllers, and the single point of failure problem. A distributed scheme increases
workloads for each member in terms of storage and computation overheads, although the
system is more scalable and eliminates the need of the central authority. For either
environment (centralized or distributed), the design should optimize the system
performance measured in terms of overheads (communication, computation, and storage)
burdened on each group member, the key server, and the controller of the system.

2.8.2 Efficiency of Key Management and Distribution
The efficiency of several security services relies on the strength of the key management
and the cryptographic strength of the keys. An efficient GKM scheme should mainly
reduce time complexity and computation load of key generation, key distribution, and
rekeying. The scheme should be scalable as the group size increases. Many efficient
GKMs generate keys based on the structure of a key tree and the hierarchy of keys,
especially for centralized and decentralized environments. In a distributed environment, a
contributory GKM scheme deems to be more suitable.

2.8.3 Early Detection and Prevention
The secure GCS should be operated with strong authentication and access control
mechanisms by which a violation of resource utilization and unauthorized activities, e.g.,
a member impersonation and a message fabrication, can be detected early and prevented.
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A group signature signed on messages can also provide source authentication, message
integrity, and non-repudiation services to the receiver and verifier. Since communication,
storage, and processing overheads are the primary cost for these security services, a
trade-off between overheads and the protection level should be properly optimized.

2.8.4 Increased Concern over Privacy
Privacy becomes a major concern for users participating in group communications where
there are a large number of message recipients so that message confidentiality may not be
fully guaranteed, and security enforcement may not be possible or adequate. In general,
anonymity service substantially increases overheads and the complexity. Thus, it may not
be suitably in deployed in distributed environments where resources are scarce. Instead,
partial anonymity can be utilized in such a way that, for a large group, only partial
identification is required to prove a rightful communication while it still preserves
member privacy.

2.8.5 Implementation of Security Services for Different Applications
From the perspective of group-oriented applications, security services should be offered
and compatibly interacted for any applications to achieve a high security level. Thus, the
system should be transparent to applications.

2.9 Conclusion
Group communications has received considerable attention owing to its nature to transmit
a single message to multiple recipients with the minimum bandwidth overhead. The
objective of this chapter is to provide a better understanding on possible attacks, security
requirements, and security services in group communications. Figures 2.2 and 2.3
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identify fundamental attributes for evaluating mechanisms in providing one or more
security services to GCSs as well as attributes corresponding to those supported security
services. Then, based on attributes in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the comparisons of these
outstanding secure GCSs are summarized in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. There are some
challenges for designing secure group communications, such as system-wide
performance, efficiency of key management, privacy issue, implementation, and tradeoff
between security and overheads. Readers are further referred to Reference [2] for a
survey on secure group communications in wireless networks, such as mobile ad hoc
networks and wireless sensor networks, for a broader understanding on secure group
communications.

Table 2.2 The Comparison Table of Secure GCSs Along With Fundamental Performance-evaluating Attributes [1]

Table 2.3 The Comparison Table of Secure GCSs Along With Service-specified Performance-evaluating Attributes [1]

CHAPTER 3
SECURITY SERVICES IN GROUP COMMUNICATIONS OVER WIRELESS
INFRASTRUCTURE, MOBILE AD-HOC, AND WIRELESS SENSOR
NETWORKS

3.1

Objective

Group communications in wireless networks has been facilitating many emerging
applications which require packet delivery from one or more sender(s) to multiple
receivers. Owing to insecure wireless channels, group communications are susceptible to
various kinds of attacks. Though a number of proposals have been reported to secure
group communications, provisioning security in group communications in wireless
networks remains a critical and challenging issue. This chapter presents a survey on
recent advances in security requirements and services in group communications in three
types of wireless networks, and discusses challenges in designing secure group
communications in these networks: wireless infrastructure networks, mobile ad hoc
networks, and wireless sensor networks.

3.2

Introduction

Group communications refers to either point-to-multipoint (in which a packet is delivered
from a group member to the other members) or multipoint-to-multipoint communications
(in which packets are sent from multiple members to other members simultaneously).
The characteristics of different wireless networks, i.e., wireless infrastructure networks
(WINS), ad hoc networks (AHNs), and wireless sensor networks (WSNs), are vastly
different in terms of group management, packet types, and resources. However, one
common risk among these networks is that all members communicating through wireless
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channels are more insecure and susceptible to numerous attacks, as compared to wired
networks [26]-[28]. Thus, an attempt to establish secure group communications (SGC)
over these networks faces various challenges in order to meet security requirements as
specified in Table 3.1.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, various known attacks are
presented, followed by a discussion on group communications, and security requirements
and services in securing group communications. Several proposals for SGC over these
different networks are then discussed.

3.3 Known Attacks in Wireless Networks
Here, this work presents some known attacks (intensively discussed in [27]-[30]), and
sparsely discussed in other references) that pose a significant threat to group
communications over wireless networks, and categorize these attacks based on their
impacts, including data integrity and confidentiality, power consumption, routing,
identity, privacy, and service availability. For example, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate
some of these attacks in a real wireless network.
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Scenario: Bob communicates with a data-sensitive server through hybrid (infrastructure/ad hoc) wireless networks.
Attacks: Eavesdropping, impersonate, flooding, and collusion.
Steps:

1A. Alice has previously compromised NI by any means.
1B. Alternatively, N1 is a colluding attacker that shares information and helps to carry out the attack.
2.
Alice may command N1 to start eavesdropping on Bob's incoming and outgoing packets. If possibly, Alice
may eavesdrop on N1 packets due to insecure wireless channel. This eavesdropping attack aims to collect
more information about Bob's communication with the Server D for traffic analysis.
Alice floods Bob's machine or network such that Bob is denied of service. Note that Alice is unlikely to ask
3.
a colluding N1 to launch the flooding attack because N1 will possibly be caught.
4.
Alice impersonate Bob's identity to falsely gain access, on behalf of Bob, to information authorized by
server D to Bob . Note that Bob cannot notify server D due to the effect of the flooding attack and we
assume that Bob does not use an out-of-bound channel (e.g., telephone to the server D's operator).

Figure 3.1 An illustration of mixed attacks in a real wireless network [2].

3.3.1 Data Integrity and Confidentiality-related Attacks
In general, this type of attacks attempts to reveal or compromise the integrity and
confidentiality of data contained in the transmitted packets.
A. Denial of service on sensing (DoSS) attack — an attacker tampers with data before
being read by sensor nodes, thereby resulting in false readings and eventually
leading to a wrong decision. This DoSS attack generally targets the physical layer
applications in an environment where sensor nodes are located.
B. Node capture attack — an attacker physically captures sensor nodes and
compromises them such that sensor readings sensed by compromised nodes are
inaccurate or manipulated. In addition, the attacker may attempt to extract essential
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cryptographic keys (e.g., a group key) from wireless nodes which are used to
protect communications in most wireless networks.
C. Eavesdropping attack — an attacker secretly eavesdrops ongoing communications
between targeted nodes to collect information on connections (e.g., MAC address)
and cryptography (e.g., session key materials). Although this attack can be
classified into other categories such as privacy-related attacks, it is grouped into this
category owing to its severe consequence in the sense that the collected
cryptographic information may break the encryption keys such that the attacker can
retrieve meaningful data.

3.3.2 Power Consumption-related Attacks
In general, this type of attack attempts to exhaust the device's power supply, which is one
of the most valuable assets in wireless networks. The worst case would cause a collapse
of network communications.
A. Denial of sleep attack — an attacker tries to drain a wireless device's limited power
supply (especially sensor devices) so that the node's lifetime is significantly
shortened. In general, during a sleep period in which there is no radio transmission,
the MAC layer protocol reduces the node's power consumption by regulating the
node's radio communications. Thus, the attacker attacks the MAC layer protocol to
shorten or disable the sleep period. If the number of power-drained nodes is large
enough, the whole sensor network can be severely disrupted.
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3.3.3 Service Availability and Bandwidth Consumption-related Attacks
These attacks can, in fact, also be categorized into power consumption-related attacks.
However, since they mainly aim to overwhelm the forwarding capability of forwarding
nodes or consume sparsely available bandwidth, they are more likely related to the
service availability and bandwidth consumption concerns, and are thus highlighted in this
category. If these attacks result in a denial of service to legitimate members, they can also
be referred to as a variant of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
A. Flooding attack — an attacker typically sends a large number of packets to the access
point or a victim to prevent the victim or the whole network from establishing or
continuing communications.
B. Jamming (radio interference) attack — an attacker can effectively cut off wireless
connectivity among nodes by transmitting continuous radio signals such that other
authorized users are denied from accessing a particular frequency channel. The
attacker can also transmit jamming radio signals to intentionally collide with
legitimate signals originated by target nodes.
C. Replay attack — an attacker copies a forwarded packet and later sends out the copies
repeatedly and continuously to the victim in order to exhaust the victim's buffers or
power supplies, or to base stations and access points in order to degrade the network
performance. In addition, the replayed packets can crash the poorly designed
applications or exploit the vulnerable holes in poor system designs.
D. Selective forwarding attack — a forwarding node selectively drops packets that have
been originated or forwarded by certain nodes, and forwards other irrelevant
packets instead.
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3.3.4 Routing-related Attacks
In general, these attacks attempt to change routing information, and to manipulate and
benefit from such a change in various ways.
A. Unauthorized routing update attack — an attacker attempts to update routing
information maintained by routing hosts, such as base stations, access points, or
data aggregation nodes, to exploit the routing protocols, to fabricate the routing
update messages, and to falsely update the routing table. This attack can lead to
several incidents, including: some nodes are isolated from base stations; a network
is partitioned; messages are routed in loop and dropped after the Time-To-Live
(TTL) expires; messages are perversely forwarded to unauthorized attackers; a
black-hole router in which messages are maliciously discarded is created; and a
previous key is still being used by current members because the rekeying messages
destined to members are misrouted or delayed by false routings.
B. Wormhole attack — an adversary intercepts communications originated by the
sender, copies a portion or the whole packet, and speeds up sending the copied
packet through a specialized "wormhole tunnel" such that the copied packet arrives
at the destination earlier than the original packet traversed through normal routes.
The wormhole tunnel can be created by several means, such as by sending the
copied packet through a wired network and at the end of the tunnel transmitting
over a wireless channel, by using a boosting long-distance antenna, by sending
through a low-latency route, or by using any out-of-bound channel as illustrated in
Figure 3.2. The wormhole attack poses many threats especially to routing protocols
and other protocols that greatly rely on geographic location and proximity, and
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many subsequent attacks (e.g., selectively forwarding, sinkhole, etc.) can be
launched after the wormhole path has attracted a large number of traversing
packets. Readers are referred to Reference [29] for details and a mechanism to
detect such an attack.
C. Sinkhole attack — an attacker attracts all nodes to send all packets through one or
several of its colluding nodes, called sinkhole node(s), so that the attacker (and its
colluding group) has access to all traversing packets. To attract the victimized
nodes, the sinkhole node is usually presented as an attractive forwarding node such
as having a higher trust level, being advertised as a node in the shortest-distance or
short-delay path to a base station, or a nearest data-aggregating node (in WSNs).

3.3.5 Identity-related Attacks
In general, these attacks cooperate with eavesdropping attacks or other network-sniffing
software to obtain the vulnerable MAC and network addresses. They target the
authentication entity.
A. Impersonate attack — an attacker impersonates another node's identity (either MAC
or IP address) to establish a connection with or to launch other attacks onto a
victim; the attacker may also use the victim's identity to establish a connection with
other nodes, or to launch other attacks on behalf of the victim as illustrated in
Figure 3.1. There are several softwares capable of reprogramming the devices to
forge the MAC and network addresses.
B. Sybil attack — a single node presents itself to other nodes with multiple spoofed
identifications (either MAC address or network address). The attacker can
impersonate other nodes' identities or simply create multiple arbitrary identities in
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the MAC and/or network layer. Then, the attack poses threats to other protocol
layers; for examples, packets traversed on the route consisting of fake identities are
selectively dropped or modified; or a threshold-based signature mechanism that
relies on a specified number of nodes is corrupted.

3.3.6 Privacy-related Attacks
In general, this type of attack uncovers the anonymity and privacy of communications
and, in the worst case, can cause false accusations to an innocent victim.
A. Traffic analysis attack — an attacker attempts to gain knowledge about the network,
traffic, and nodes' behaviors. The traffic analysis may include examining the
message length, the message pattern or coding, and the duration of the message
stayed in the router. In addition, the attacker can correlate all incoming and
outgoing packets at any router or member. Such an attack violates the privacy and
can harm the members for being linked with messages (e.g., religious-related
opinions that are deemed provocative in some communities). The attacker can also
perversely link any two members with any unrelated connections.

If a group of attackers collude to launch any type of attacks, it is referred to as a
collusion attack. For examples, the colluding group of attackers orchestrates to collect
information to significantly exploit the system, to masquerade a legitimate member and
send out fault messages on behalf of that member, to conjointly mount attacks against
other members or network entities, or to falsely accuse a legitimate member as an
attacker.
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Scenario: Bob (and Denice) communicates with Charlie (and Eve) through a mobile ad hoc network.
Attacks 1: Sybil, sinkhole, and selectively forwarding attacks.
1.1. Alice generates multiple fake identifications, and advertises an attractive "low-latency" path consisting of these
identities to N2. (Sybil attack)
1.2. Alice advertises this low-latency path to NI, who updates its routing table accordingly. N1 forwards Bob's packets to
Charlie through this low-latency path. (Sinkhole attack)
1.3. Alice passively eavesdrops all Bob-Charlie's packets or selectively drops all Bob-Charlie's packets while still
forwarding Denice-Eve's packets to reduce the possibility of being caught. (Selectively forwarding attack)
Attacks 2: Eavesdropping, wormhole, false routing update, and collusion attacks.
Steps:
2.1. Alice sets up a wormhole tunnel (in this illustration, either thin wired networks or thru powerful antennas) to Gina,
a colluding attacker. (Collusion attack)
2.2. Alice eavesdrops Bob-N1's packets and copies them. (Eavesdropping attack)
2.3. Alice forwards the collies to Gina through the wormhole tunnel. (wormhole attack)
2.4. Gina forwards the copies to N2. N2 updates the new route between N1 and N2 through this wormhole tunnel (false
routing update).
Steps:

Figure 3.2 An illustration of the routing-related attacks and other attacks [2].

3.4

Secure Group Communication Systems

A group communication system (GCS) consists of five common operations: initiate, join,
leave, partition, and merge. The group is first established by initial members. Then, one
or several prospective members join the group while some members leave the group. This
is so-called the dynamic membership. A large number of membership changes, referred
to as a bulk membership change, require a specialized protocol design without degrading
the group performance. In some scenarios, a group can be partitioned into smaller
subgroups or merged into a bigger group. This can also be considered as a bulk
membership change, but the transitions among groups likely incur overheads. This
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dynamic membership aspect requires the GCS to rekey the session keys in order to
preserve the key secrecy. For WSNs, this dynamic membership may not be necessary
because the keys are most likely pre-determined prior to deployment [31]-[33]. In
wireless infrastructure and ad hoc networks, most, if not all, GKM schemes require each
member to keep the membership list, thus incurring a huge communication overhead.
However, in a wireless sensor network, this list might not be necessary due to 1) storage
limitation of sensor nodes, and 2) the provision of pre-selected entities (data-aggregating
nodes) in keeping track of their members.

Table 3.1 Characteristics of Possible Attacks on SGC over Wireless Networks [2]
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3.5 Security Requirements and Security Services in SGC
This section discusses security requirements and corresponding security services in
securing group communications and mitigating attacks as summarized in Tables 3.1 and
3.2. Table 3.3 describes in-depth details of the characteristics of major security services
over wireless networks. Many systems have been proposed to address the requirements
and provide such services, but only a few promising systems are presented here.
Group Key Management (GKM) — The fundamental security service in SGC is
the provision of a shared group key, which is used to encrypt a group message, to sign the
message, to authenticate members and messages, and to authorize an access to traffic and
group resources. Thus, the strength of SGC largely relies on the cryptographic strength of
the keys and the key management protocol. A GKM scheme deployed in any secure
group communication system should satisfy the following requirements: key generation
is secure; imitation of the group key should be infeasible or computationally difficult to
succeed; the group key is securely distributed and only the legitimate users can receive a
valid group key; revocation of the group key upon every membership change should be
immediate; every membership change must result in rekeying of associated keys; and a
rekeying of the key is secure. Basically, GKM can be categorized into the three types
based on how the key is generated: centralized, distributed, and contributory [34]-[35]. A
revocation can be performed by limiting the session period that the keys are valid. Then,
the session period and remaining period are calculated and attached along with keys
before being distributed to all members. If keys need to be rekeyed (with three triggering
conditions as discussed in Table 3.3), the key revocation can be sent by the designated
entity to notify all members holding these keys, as discussed in [31] and [34].
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Group authentication — In group communications (1-to-Many and Many-toMany), a member can be either the designated sender or the designated receiver, or both.
Both users and messages should be authenticated to safeguard identity-related attacks. In
some systems, a member certificate is issued by the trusted certificate issuing entity along
with its validation period. In some systems, the expired certificate is maintained for
further verifications, as discussed in [34]. The expired certificates are compiled into the
revocation list, which is distributed to notify all members.
Group authorization and access control — In any conventional access control
mechanism, a member who holds a decrypting key can access full contents in a flow (or
all flows in an aggregated stream). This is referred to as a single access privilege. In
many group-oriented applications, group members can be assigned with multiple access
privileges. Thus, the stream should be accessed with different access privileges such that
only members who have an appropriate privilege can access the corresponding portions
of contents (or flows). This is referred to as multiple access privilege.
Group accounting and non-repudiation — Any group operation executed or a
record of resources utilized by a member should be available for tracking in order to
detect any abusing usage of resources and operations. A non-repudiation service can
ensure that the identity of a member whose activities are in dispute can be fully and
precisely determined by the designated entity. In general, the group signature and the
member certificate can be used to authenticate the source and message, and to provide a
proof of the source's activity in the case of a dispute.
Group privacy and Anonymity — Any information related to a group message,
such as identities of a sender and a receiver, message length, and time, can be protected
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or hidden to preserve privacy and anonymity of members. An anonymous message refers
to a message that carries no information about the senders and receivers.
Group message integrity and confidentiality — Message integrity should be
preserved by ensuring that the message has not been fabricated (some or all portions of
the message have not been added, deleted or modified) or dropped by an unauthorized
entity. This can be done by several means, including hashing and signing the message
along with strong encryption keys. In ad hoc networks, group members may have
different capabilities and protocols to perform different levels of encryption on group
messages. Thus, some messages may be encrypted with a strong encryption while others
with a weak encryption are relatively easily breakable. In WSNs, sensor nodes may have
similar capabilities and protocols that are embedded before deployment. Confidentiality
ensures that only authorized members can retrieve meaningful data from the message.
Group Survivability and Availability — An attacker can attack the routing hosts
(i.e., access points and base stations) to isolate some or all group members, or partition
the group. Thus, all routing hosts must be protected to ensure group survivability.
However, the attacker can still target a joining procedure (i.e., by flooding the access
point or base station in wireless infrastructure networks and WSNs), thus causing service
unavailability to other legitimate users. Group availability ensures that only authorized
users can always communicate within the group by using restricted group resources, and
any violation of exceeding the limitation of group resources will be promptly detected.
Table 3.2 illustrates each discussed attack along with security services that can be
deployed to mitigate its impact. For examples, the impact caused by the flooding attack
may be partially mitigated by authenticating sources that generate the flooding packets
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along with an early detection of a massive amount of packets originated by a single
source. Thus, the flooding packets would be dropped immediately once such an attack
has been detected. Unauthorized routing update can be detected and prevented by the
following services: authenticating both the source and message to determine whether the
routing update message is legitimate and originated by an authorized member; enforcing
an access control over routing table; signing the routing update message such that
message integrity is preserved and no attacker has falsely modified the message;
encrypting all management packets (routing update requests and replies); and any
loophole or sinkhole routing, which possibly leads to a denial of service, will be tested,
detected, and fixed prior to the actual deployment.
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Table 3.2 Security Services to Countermeasure Attacks [2]

Note: et. .} = an encryption of ...

3.6

SGC over Wireless Infrastructure Networks

This section surveys some SGCs which provide security protection over wireless
infrastructure networks.
DeCleene et al. [30] presented a hierarchy-based key management protocol that
divides an operational field into administratively independent areas. The area key is used
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to encrypt the message containing the data key. The data key is a network-wide shared
key, and is used to encrypt the data message. When users frequently move within areas,
the area key is rekeyed, thereby resulting in a significant degradation of group
performance in terms of processing and communication overheads. Thus, several
rekeying algorithms have been proposed to reduce the need of rekeying, thus decreasing
communication and processing overheads. The delayed rekeying algorithm uses the
"extra key owner list (EKOL)" to store the area keys belonged to the leaving member and
that member's ID. When that member re-enters the area, the area keys are restored.
However, once the EKOL is full, the first recorded area keys are discarded to make room
for other members. A member can only hold a limited number of area keys.
Pros: Low overheads; highly dynamic membership is supported.
Cons: The area keys may be easily compromised since the area keys have been
repeatedly re-used for often-moving members.
Sun et al. [36] matched the tree-based key management with the physical cellular
network topology in order to build a topology-matching key management (TMKM) tree.
When the user moves among cells, an efficient handoff mechanism handles the relocation
of that user in the TMKM tree. Each cell has a corresponding wait-to-be-removed (WTB)
list that keeps track of previous and current cell members. A relocation of a member
between two cells requires a rekeying process to preserve the key secrecy. The rekeying
process is performed based on information from the WTB lists of these cells. The key
manager, called key distribution center (KDC), maintains and updates the WTB lists of
all cells in the network accordingly. The communication overheads incurred by the
rekeying process can be reduced by delivering new keys locally in the TMKM tree to
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only members who need the rekeyed keys. It was shown that communication overheads
due to the efficient handoff rekeying processes using the TMKM tree scheme can be
greatly reduced as much as 80% as compared to those using conventional topology
independent key management (TIKM) tree schemes.
Pros: Low communication overheads.
Cons: The scheme does not consider the overheads incurred by the KDC that could
result in very poor performance in the actual deployment.
Gupta and Cherukuri [26] presented three schemes: single session key (SSK),
different session key (DSK), and a combination (HYBRID). These schemes are based on
location-based access control in which only users who are located in specific locations
can access the services. In the SSK scheme, a base station (BS) assigns the same session
key (sk) to all members. In the DSK scheme, a BS assigns a different session key to each
member. In the HYBRID scheme, a BS assigns the same sk to all the members who have
been a "stable" member in the cell for more than a specified period of time; otherwise, it
assigns a different sk to a "non-stable" member.
Pros: Their simulations of SGC over all cellular networks with high mobility showed
that the communication overhead using the HYBRID scheme is lower than those using
the DSK and SSK schemes.
Cons: Strict time synchronization is required to determine whether a member is
classified as stable or non-stable; the scheme did not provide a means for base stations to
exchange information of their members; and handoffs, which can incur more overheads,
were not addressed.
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Westerhoff et al. [38] presented a decentralized architecture called mobility
support — a multicast-based approach (MOMBASA) to achieve low latency for handoffs
with minimum packet loss as well as to secure protocol operations. MOMBASA enables
each mobile node to register with a proxy, called Mobility-Enabling Proxy (MEP), which
in turn participates in the multicast group on behalf of the mobile node. The mobile node
communicates with MEP via unicast while MEP communicates with the multicast group
via multicast. Thus, MEP converts unicast and multicast packets between the mobile
node and the multicast group. The security analysis shows that MOMBASA is protected
against various attacks by using three security components: packet filtering at access
network boundaries, deployment of an authentication, authorization, access control
(AAA) infrastructure, and rate limiting against DoS attacks.
Pros: MOMBASA is provably secure from many threats; performance degradation due
to handoffs is negligible (low-latency handoff); less packet loss; and the workloads
among access points and the AAA server are fairly distributed.
Cons: The scheme only considered handoffs when MEP is no longer functioning, but
did not consider the case when the membership is highly dynamic. When there are
messages destined for idle nodes, the MEP associated with these nodes has to multicast
the paging update messages to other MEPs, thus incurring a significant overhead.

57
3.7 SGC over Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETS)
This section surveys some SGCs which provide security protection specifically over
mobile ad hoc networks.
Kaya et al. [39] proposed a dynamic multicast group management protocol that
attempts to equally distribute the workload of securing communications to all
participating members. Group information and associated security services are
disseminated and maintained by all members throughout MANETs, and the service right
certificates are given by the designated group manager to members for accessing
information. The group manager is temporarily selected per session, and it establishes a
physical security tree, authenticates the prospective members, updates the security tree
per membership change, and handles the revocation of certificates. The security tree is
used to securely forward the shared group key to members while the data multicast tree is
used to forward the encrypted data messages to authorized members.
Pros: Communication overheads and latency of joining/leaving/key revocation
processes do not substantially degrade the group performance as the number and speed of
joining/leaving nodes increase.
Cons: The scheme did not discuss how the group manager is selected as well as the
transitions of group information between the new and old group managers. The
simulation tried to illustrate the impact of dynamic membership with a very small number
of nodes, and the results may not be valid for a large group.
Striki and Baras [34] presented a Merkle Tree-based user authentication scheme
by constructing dynamic distributed central authorities (CAs) based on Merkle trees, and
then equipping these CAs with two key generation protocols: 2 d - Octopus, and Tree-
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based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH)-based 2 d - Octopus. It has been emphasized that
incorporating user authentication and key distribution algorithms in a collaborative
manner into SGC yields a scalable and efficient key management protocol in MANETs.
Pros: The modified Merkle tree-based scheme with Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman
(TGDH)-based 2 d - Octopus has lower communication and processing overheads than that
with 2 d - Octopus and another existing protocol, one-way function tree (OFT) as the size
of the group increases.
Cons: The scheme did not discuss how this integration of authentication and key
distribution could better protect SGC against various threats, such as DoS and collusion
attacks.
Balachandran et al. [35] proposed a key agreement scheme for SGC over
MANETs, referred to as the Chinese Remainder Theorem and Diffie-Hellman (CRDTH)
scheme, which aims to solve two problematic issues in ad hoc environments: key
serialization and absence of a central authority in MANETs. The key management in this
scheme is a contributory-based GKM. All members exchange their contributed key share
by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism, and then the members
independently but mutually generate the group key based on the Chinese remainder
theorem (CRT).
Pros: The scheme can equally distribute the computational workloads to all members.
The scheme requires only one round of broadcast to rekey the group key for a leaving
process and two rounds for an initial key formation process (during a group formation)
and for a joining process. No a priori knowledge and no member serialization are
required. Highly dynamic membership is supported.
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Cons: The authors only suggested how the scheme would be compromised rather than
validating the security of the scheme.
Lazos and Poovendran [39] presented the routing-aware key distribution
(RAwKey) problem and proposed an optimal solution that minimizes energy expenditure
caused by the rekeying process in an energy-constrained wireless Ad Hoc network. The
key idea is to construct an energy-efficient key distribution scheme (operating at the
application layer) for SGCs over ad hoc networks by gathering cross-layer information
from the physical layer (i.e., the node transmission power) and the network layer (i.e., the
multicast routing tree).
Pros: The performance of the optimal energy-efficient solution for rekeying does not
substantially change as the group size varies, and the cross-layer algorithm can obtain a
sub-optimal solution with low complexity.
Cons: The complexity of the scheme is still rather high and the efficiency for the actual
deployment remains a great challenge.

3.8

SGC over Wireless Sensor Networks

This section covers SGCs which provide security protection over wireless sensor
networks.
Zhu et al. [31] proposed a key management protocol, called a localized encryption
and authentication protocol (LEAP), for large scale distributed sensor networks. The
protocol is designed based on two observations: different packet types exchanged among
sensor nodes require different security services, and a single key management scheme
may not be suitable for various security requirements. The proposed scheme uses four
types of keys for fundamental security services, e.g., authentication and access control, to
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secure communications. These four types of keys include a pair-wise key used between a
sensor node and the base station, a pair-wise key used between a pair of two sensor
nodes, a shared cluster key used among all sensor nodes in the same cluster, and the
group key used among all sensor nodes. Thereafter, the scheme provides security
services that can mitigate several attacks. For examples, authentication of one-hop
broadcast communications among nodes with one-way key chains can mitigate the
impersonate attack, and a timestamp is used to expire the keys to prevent the node
capture and sybil attacks.
Pros: Low communication overheads; the scheme is energy efficient.
Con: The scheme did not discuss the power consumption of sensor nodes in deploying
some of the proposed security mechanisms.
Yu and Guan [32] proposed a group-based key pre-distribution scheme by
partitioning the network into hexagonal grids with a specified size. Nodes are then
divided into groups, and each group is placed into a grid in such a way that the number of
neighbors of a node is minimized, thereby reducing the power consumption. The scheme
classifies communications of sensor nodes into two types: inter-group and in-group. The
secret matrix G is shared by all groups, and each group is distinctively assigned a secret
matrix A. Each node selects correspondingly a column from the matrix G and a row from
the matrix A. Thus, two nodes in the same group can compute the pair-wise key used to
secure in-group communications. Furthermore, a number of secret matrices B's are
selectively assigned to groups in such a way that any two neighboring groups share a
portion of the secret matrices. Then, the two neighboring groups determine which of the
shared secret matrices B's they share in order to generate the shared keys. Upon the key
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generation, two nodes in the neighboring groups mutually agree on which rows will be
selected from these previously selected B matrices. Thus, they can compute the pair-wise
key used to secure inter-group communications.
Pros: The scheme provisions a high degree of connectivity, which is defined as the
fraction of the size of the largest connected components over the size of the entire sensor
network. Furthermore, the connected components define a graph in which any two nodes
can always find a route between them. The scheme incurs a low storage overhead, and
offers a better safeguard against node capture attacks as compared to several existing
schemes.
Cons: The optimal grid size may not be precisely determined, thus possibly resulting in
two incidents: the inter-group keys may not be generated if the grid size is too small, and
the power consumption is relatively high if the grid size is too large. The computational
and time complexities might be substantial.
Zhang and Cao [33] proposed a set of pre-distributed and local collaborationbased group rekeying (PCGR) schemes to mitigate the node capture attack and the DoSS
attack. The basic-PCGR (B-PCGR) scheme was first proposed with the assumption that
the future group keys can be preloaded into the sensor nodes before deployment. Thus,
the future keys must be protected by encryption with some polynomials, which are kept
by some 1-hop away neighboring nodes. Thus, the B-PCGR scheme requires each sensor
node to collaborate with each other to retrieve their encrypted future keys, and to detect
and protect themselves against any attempt to compromise nodes. However, the B-PCGR
scheme has two limitations: an attacker can retrieve the polynomials by searching only 1hop away neighboring nodes of the victim, and to successfully stage an attack requires
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compromising only a small number of 1-hop neighboring nodes. To overcome the first
limitation, the Cascading-PCGR (C-PCGR) scheme is proposed to distribute the
polynomial shares to 2- or 3-hop away neighboring nodes. To overcome the second
limitation, the random variance-based PCGR (RV-PCGR) scheme is proposed to add
"random variance" numbers to the polynomials to strengthen the polynomials in order to
make them more difficult for the attacker to retrieve the encrypted future keys.
Pros: The schemes can effectively protect SGC against the node capture and DoSS
attacks.
Cons: The rekeying is very limited owing to a limited number of reusable future keys.
A priori knowledge of group operations (e.g., a set of future keys, key-generating
function, and group joining/leaving processes) is required, and thus any real-time
adaptation of these group operations cannot be performed online. The collaboration of
nodes is required, but, in many sensor networks, such collaboration may not be possible
at all as well as may consume unnecessary power consumption.
Huang et al. [40] proposed a secure level key infrastructure for multicast
(SLIMCAST) to protect data confidentiality via hop-by-hop re-encryption and to mitigate
the DoS-based flooding attack through an intrusion detection and deletion mechanism.
The SLIMCAST protocol divides a group routing tree into levels and branches in a
cluster manner. Communications among nodes in each level in each branch of the group
tree is protected by a level key such that only the local level key is rekeyed during joining
and leaving processes. SLIMCAST enables an upstream node to aggregate data packets
from its downstream children nodes, and then re-encrypts the aggregated packet with the
level keys that this node shares with its parent nodes. The re-encrypted packet is then sent
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upstream towards a base station. Furthermore, the duplicate packets from the sibling
nodes will be discarded to reduce redundant bandwidth and power consumption.
Pros: Low communication overheads and power consumption. The performance does
not substantially degrade as the group size increases.
Cons: The performance is degraded (i.e., high power consumption) when membership
changes are massive.
Wadaa et al. [27] proposed an energy-efficient protocol to provision anonymity in
WSNs. The protocol divides the network into clusters. Two activities are defined in each
cluster: intra-cluster activity (i.e., data generation) and inter-cluster activity (i.e., data
transmission). For intra-cluster activities inside a cluster, a node periodically collects and
formulates the sensor readings, and then reports to the designated entity, called
transaction instance manager. That manager collects all node reports and formulates the
transaction instance report (TIR). For inter-cluster activities, all managers send the TIR to
the sink node (i.e., a base station) through neighboring managers in a hop-by-hop
manner. Then, the protocol formulates the anonymity problem, and identifies and
eliminates the minimum number of nodes that cause the maximum loss of sensor
readings.
Pros: Energy-efficient. The performance does not substantially degrade as the group
size increases.
Cons: The scheme did not analyze or prove substantially the anonymity level per
transmission.
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Karlof and Wagner [28] discussed attacks that can disrupt group routing in
WSNs. Reference 28 illustrates how each attack is executed, and describes the existing
mechanisms in mitigating the attacks.

Note that SGCs proposed for the above three types of networks may be adopted
into other types of wireless networks, but consideration of such an adaptation is beyond
the scope of this dissertation.

Table 3.3 Characteristics of Security Services in SGC over Wireless Networks [2]
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3.9

Open Challenges

Here, this work outlines some challenges that should be tackled, and define future
research directions on SGC over wireless networks.
1. Integration of security services. As illustrated in Table 3.2, most attacks can be
greatly mitigated by the fundamental security services. Thus, it is still the greatest
challenge to design an energy-efficient scheme that integrates more security services
to satisfy various security requirements, particularly, authentication, access control,
and non-repudiation (via group signatures), without incurring significant overheads.
2. Deployment of SGC in heterogeneous wireless networks. With a higher demand for
more functionalities in wireless devices, a SGC scheme should be able to be deployed
in heterogeneous wireless networks, including cellular networks, Wireless LANs,
wireless ad hoc networks, and wireless sensor networks, and to support
communications over a hybrid of wireless and wired networks.
3. Optimization on group performance with respect to overheads and limited resources.
To be efficient, a scheme should optimize group performance subject to overheads
(communication, processing, and storage) and limited resources (i.e., memory,
bandwidth, and power supply).
4. Extension to IPv6 wireless networks. An IPv6 wireless network seems to be a
promising next generation network, and some works are addressing the end-to-end
built-in security. Future research on SGC is engineered to support IPv6 wireless
networks.
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3.10 Conclusion
The number of applications of group communications over wireless networks has been
steadily increasing such as group-oriented military systems (on-the-field commander
conference over wireless devices) and education systems (teacher lecturing in a distant
learning classroom). However, communications over wireless channels is, by nature,
insecure and easily susceptible to various kinds of attacks. Many existing works have
attempted to incorporate security into such communications.
To better understand SGC over wireless networks, this work presents known
attacks that can severely disrupt or even shut down group communications in wireless
networks. Then, necessary security requirements are discussed and fundamental security
services are provided to meet these requirements and safeguard the communications
against these attacks. This work has demonstrated that several attacks can be prevented
and mitigated by proposed security services. This work has also reported several existing
works on SGC over three types of wireless networks: wireless infrastructure networks,
mobile ad hoc networks, and wireless sensor networks, as summarized in Table 3.4. With
respect to limited computation capability and scarce wireless channels, these works
basically attempt to reduce communication and processing overheads, and to fend off
some particular attacks. To complete the survey on SGC over wireless networks, this
work has presented some open challenges that still need to be overcome.

= Information not Available about the characteristic OR the characteristic is not likely possible or not applicable.
Note 1:
2: PK =Public Key.
3: Only specified attacks discussed in the respective references are listed here even though each of these schemes may mitigate other attacks as well.

Table 3.4 Comparison of SGC over Wireless Networks [2]

CHAPTER 4
ADAPTIVE TRUST AND REPUTATION SYSTEM

4.1

Objective

This section introduces the trust and reputation system with two objectives: to propose
the resilient trust and reputation system that can be implemented in different network
environments; to analyze security concerns in many aspects including an attack
classification, an illustration of attack scenarios, and an introduction of defense
mechanisms responding dependently on every attack scenarios.

4.2

Introduction of Trust and Reputation System

A trust and reputation system becomes an increasingly important research area and is
implemented in many commercial websites, in particular auction websites, which allow a
customer to rate other customers' auction behaviors. In general, all parties are evaluated
for different reasons: a seller lies about the products he is selling or dishonestly blames
the buyer for some bad products; a buyer lies about the services or products he
unsatisfactorily received and he exaggerates the bad reviews about the seller; a group of
buyers colludes to give bad reviews to a specific seller such that the seller becomes very
untrustworthy; a buyer and a seller collude to exaggerate very good reviews to each other
such that they become very trustworthy without actually performing proper actions.
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4.3

The Adaptive Trust and Reputation System

This section discusses the processes of the trust and reputation system.

4.3.1 Definitions of Trustworthiness, Trust, and Reputation
There are many definitions regarding to the taxonomy of existing trust and reputation
systems, but in general, trust relationship among network entities can be established
based on two types of experiences: direct experience and indirect experience. In most
trust and reputation systems, the direct experience can be obtained from self observations
and the indirect experience can be obtained from other network entities' direct experience
toward the entity of interest. However, in this dissertation, direct experience is obtained
from self observations and other network entities' observation on transactions that the
node, referred to as the originator node, generates or establishes. The indirect experience
is simply a report of the trustworthiness value of the entity of interest that is known to the
reporting node from previous transactions. The transaction in this dissertation includes all
network activities depending on applications into which the trust and reputation system
has been applied or integrated. This dissertation assumes that any transaction is done in a
certain period of time, referred to as a session. If the trust and reputation system is
applied into communication networks, the transaction might be the transmission of
control and data packets generated by a specified application or protocol. All packets are
transmitted within a specified time period per connection. If the connection is continuous
and lasts for a long period of time, the session can be taken by a cycle ranged in a certain
period of time.

71
Direct experiences are observations done by the originator itself or observations
done by other network entities who report the findings to the originator. To perform
observations, this dissertation does not specify how the observation can be done. The
dissertation, however, suggests that the observation may be done dependent on the
network environment into which the trust and reputation system is being integrated. The
centralized networks may create a monitoring entity designed to make observations on
other network entities within a close neighboring area. The monitoring entity becomes a
central authority to collect, manage, and interact all observation findings. The distributed
networks may rely on all network entities to make observations among themselves. The
problem arises in the distributed networks in the case that the observations may be
limited owing to a geographical matter and there is no coordinating entity to collect,
store, or interact all observation findings. The challenge to deal with observation
mechanisms and associated information is still a daunting task in the distributed
networks, especially in wireless ad hoc networks or vehicular ad hoc networks.
In this dissertation, direct experiences are the observation findings from the
current or most recent session. The direct experiences can be referred to as Trust.
Meanwhile, indirect experiences are the results taken into calculation with observation
findings from the previous sessions. The indirect experiences can be referred to as
Reputation in this dissertation.
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Trustworthiness is a combination of trust and reputation in a proportional manner.
The significance of trust weighs more than that of reputation. The trustworthiness of a
network entity is defined as:
Trustworthiness = (a x Trust) + (fl x Reputation),

where a and β are weight factors determining the significance of trust and reputation in
the calculation of trustworthiness, respectively. In addition, the weight factors obey the
following rule:
a+13=1

When the new trustworthiness is being re-evaluated, the old trustworthiness is
used as a reference for the update as follows:

New Trustworthiness = ρ 1 [(a x Trust) + (fix Reputation)] + (p2 x Old Trustworthiness)

This dissertation use pi and p2 as factors to determine the timing of maintaining the
trustworthiness. The idea is that the new trustworthiness should receive a greater
attention than the old value because it freshly reflects the most recent experience.
Let

n' be the trust value of node X known to node Y. Node Y has observed on the
specific packets transmissions Ti (during the ith session) that node X has
performed forwarding packets,
RSi X,Y be the reputation value of nodes X known to node Y. Node Y has observed

on its own specific packets transmissions T1 (during the ith session) that node X
has performed forwarding packets,
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TWSi X,Y be the trustworthiness value of node X known to node Y that is evaluated

after the ith session, and can be calculated as follows:

where TWSi X,Y,TSi X,Y SiR, X,Y,TWSi, X,Z E [0,1] and M is the set of all observing nodes.
The trustworthiness is unidirectional; the trustworthiness of node X known to
node Y may be different from the trustworthiness of node Y known to node X. This can be
depicted as follows:

When the trustworthiness of a node is evaluated after the ith session, the
trustworthiness evaluated after the ith session is calculated as follows:

Thereafter, the system performs the update process to ensure that any possible error or
malicious update on the trustworthiness value is prevented or mitigated.

4.3.2 Trustworthiness Initialization Process
Depending on network environments that the trust and reputation system is integrated
into, various admission or initialization mechanisms can be deployed to handle the
joining request from a new node. If the network is centralized, there is usually a central
authority to check the new node's identity and provide the new node the joining
permission. Based on information given by the new node, a digital certificate may be
calculated and issued to enhance the authentication service. Without a central certificate
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authority, a distributed digital certification protocol can be adopted to calculate and issue
the certificate. If the network is distributed where there is no central authority, the new
node may contact a node who is intermittently assigned to admit new nodes or may
simply broadcast all nodes in the network to get instructions. Although the certification is
assumed to be securely available, the processes of generating, distributing, validating and
revoking are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Furthermore, this chapter does not
intend to suggest how the new node is admitted, but instead assumes that such admission
mechanisms are already in place. The dissertation simply lays out how the
trustworthiness value is initialized and constantly re-evaluated.
A node creates an entry in the node's trustworthiness-based table or cache, and
assigns the initial trustworthiness value to the new node. The initial value should be the
same to all new nodes and has a minimum value to mitigate a "Re-enter" attack. The
detail of the re-enter attack is given in the following section. Furthermore, the initial
value should be set differently according to the implementation. Some networks may
require the new nodes to take a slow pace to update the trustworthiness value, so they
may set the initial value very low, perhaps nearly close to the blacklist threshold.
In addition to a newly joined node, an initial trustworthiness value (INIT TW) is
assigned to an unknown node which has never been in the trustworthiness-based table.
That means, an unknown node is treated as a node newly joining the network.
The node may send out the trustworthiness request message regarding the new
node. Any node which receives this request message and has knowledge about this new
node replies the request message.
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where n represents neighbor nodes that the trustworthiness request messages inquired
about the new node, New n, sent by the node Y, and N is the set of nodes replying the
request message.
The expiry timer in the trustworthiness-based table is set to the same period of
time for each entry.

4.3.3 Trustworthiness Monitoring Process
This work does not specify the monitoring process as who monitors and how to monitor,
as how to detect and identify an error, as whether the error is a genuine performance
problem or a malicious security problem, and as how frequent the monitor is taken place.
However, the monitoring mechanism should be dependent on network environments.
There are simple suggestions for the monitoring mechanism that, during the transmission
session, there can be four parties monitoring the current transmission session as follows.
1. The source node makes a self-observation on close-distance neighbors' behaviors
on the current transmission session.
2. The destination node monitors behaviors of all intermediate nodes, as well as the
source node, throughout the current transmission session.
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3. An intermediate node monitors behaviors of some other intermediate nodes,
whose distances are within a close distance, throughout the current transmission
session.
4. An observing node whose location is within a close distance makes an
observation on all intermediate nodes' behaviors on the current transmission
session.
According to certain criteria, different negative behaviors are rated with different
scores. With a promiscuous mode, a node can detect behaviors of its close-distance
neighbors. All nodes can be publicly given certain criteria for assessing the behaviors.

Criteria
Criteria 1
Criteria 2
Criteria ...
Criteria n

Weight of Criteria
Classification
Wei
Critical
Wee
Critical
......
Wcn
Non-critical

Error Notification
Immediate
Immediate
...
Delayed

The weight of each criterion is lower than one for any non-critical error or equal
{< 1 non — critical
to one for any critical error; Wc= I,
j e J , where J is the set of all
critical
criteria. To reduce the number of error notification messages, a node may not need to
send error messages every time an error is detected. The proposed system enables two
responding measures: immediate and delayed notification, depending on the severity of
the error.
o If the error matches the criterion regarded as critical, i.e., threatening the
disruption of the system or violating the integrity of data contents, the monitoring
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node must generate an error notification message and immediately send it out
individually to the source and destination nodes.
• If the error matches the criterion regarded as non-critical, i.e., having a drop rate
of 5%, the monitoring node can delay the notification by aggregating several
more evidences within a certain time period and reports the aggregated message
via piggybacking with other packets, such as ACK packets, if such packets are
available.

4.3.4 Error Detection Process
The error detection process starts with the performance analysis that may be interacted
with human network operators to adaptively determine which criteria demonstrate the
error event both in the performance and security issue. Once the criteria are identified, the
weigh is proportionally associated with each criterion to determine how serious that
criterion should be taken into calculation. This dissertation does not offer the details of
criteria because they are dependent of the network into which the trust and reputation
system is integrated. There are many research works that offer many performance
analyses for each network, and some or all of criteria that are used in those works can be
adopted in the trust and reputation system.
If the criteria are not met, it is reasonable to presume that no error has occurred.
The weight and classification of criteria can be adjusted, given the feedback from the
performance analysis. However, if new criteria emerge, the trust and reputation system
can add the criteria to reflect the dynamic need of the network. The criteria are comprised
as the behavior policy. As depicted in Figure 4.1, the observing and detection
mechanisms are not considered in this work, but they should vary depending on the
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network environment into which the trust and reputation system is integrated. With
criteria and their associated weighs, if the behavior or error is determined as critical (i.e.,
some security violation issues), the error notification is sent out immediately to the source
and destination. The source may apply some attack prevention mechanisms to deal with
the problem. If the behavior is deemed as non-critical (i.e., performance issues), the
observation results are aggregated for the whole session, and the observation report is
sent out to the source node after the session ends. All bad behaviors are recorded in some
kind of an error cache.

Figure 4.1 An illustration of the error detection process.
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4.3.5 Trustworthiness Request Process
The trustworthiness request process can be triggered by three scenarios:
1. When the validation timer for a trustworthiness entry expires. If the timer of an
entry has expired, the node can independently and individually choose
•

whether the trustworthiness request process should be executed to obtain
newer trustworthiness information of that entry, or

•

whether that entry should be discarded to reserve memory space for future
use.

Each node may have different memory space resources to store a different number
of entries in its trustworthiness table. If the node has less memory spaces, it can
delete the entries which have expired without triggering the trustworthiness
request process.
2. When the blacklist notification is received. If the node receives a blacklist
notification from its neighbors, it checks whether the blacklisted node is in the
trustworthiness-based routing table. If that is confirmed, the node independently
and individually decides whether the trustworthiness request and re-evaluate
processes should be executed to reevaluate the blacklisted node. In some networks
where security is far more important than network overheads, all nodes can be
mandated to initiate the trustworthiness request and re-evaluation processes upon
the receipt of the notification.
3. When this is the first interaction with an unknown node. Since an unknown node
is initially assigned the initial trustworthiness value, it is reasonable to expand the
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knowledge regarding this new node by sending out the trustworthiness request
message.
In the proposed system, there are two types of the trustworthiness request
processes:
•

Local trustworthiness request (LTR) process. LTR requires a node to broadcast
the local trustworthiness request (LTReq) message to all of its close-distance
neighbors. The range of broadcasting the message can be limited to one or a few
hops away, by setting the value of Time-To-Live (TTL) in the IP header.

•

Global trustworthiness request (GTR) process. GTR requires the node to multicast
or broadcast the global trustworthiness request (GTReq) message. To reduce the
communication overhead, i.e., the number of trustworthiness request messages,
the node aggregates all nodes of interest in one message. A node should be
limited to a certain number of trustworthiness request messages per a certain
period of time, depending on the network implementation. To further reduce the
communication overhead, a node multicast the aggregated message to a limited
number of receivers, i.e., the first m entries in the trustworthiness cache (sorted by
the highest trustworthiness values).
The generation of either GTReq or LTReq messages should automatically prompt

the reset of the TREQ timer. The GTReq message is broadcast to all nodes in the
network, thus reaching a larger pool of inquired nodes, and so the TREQ timer is set to a
longer time period. Once the TREQ timer expires, all reply messages are immediately
discarded.
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The condition whether to trigger either LTR or GTR process depends on the
following three factors:
I. The responding time. GTR sets the timer the longer time period in order to
gather more reply messages, while LTR sets the timer the shorter time period.
This factor may outweigh other factors in cases when the validation timer for
a trustworthiness entry expires and when the proposed system is integrated to
delay-sensitive networks. In these cases, LTReq messages provide
information quicker than GTReq.
2. The numbers of LTReq messages and GTReq messages. This factor may
outweigh other factors in some cases such as when the performance (in terms
of overheads) is more important than security (in terms of attack mitigation)
and when the blacklist notification is received. In the former case, a node is
required to first inquire close neighbors rather than nodes located multiple
hops away. The reason is that neighbors within the close proximity may
experience or observe behaviors or errors similarly especially when those are
related to network performance issues, i.e., long delay, congestion, and link
failures. Thus, LTR gathers information that is more related to the inquiring
node. In the later case, GTReq messages are sent to mitigate the possible
incident that the inquiring node is surrounded by malicious nodes, thus being
manipulated through LTReq messages.
3. The trustworthiness level of the sender known to the receivers. Once the
receiver receives the trustworthiness request message, it checks the
trustworthiness value of the sending (inquiring) node. If the sending node has

82
low trustworthiness value, the receiver may discard the request. This factor
may outweigh other factors in some cases such as when the new node joins in
and when this is the first interaction with an unknown node. In the former
case, LTReq should be sent because GTReq messages are likely to be
discarded due to the fact that the new node has a low trustworthiness value. In
the later case, GTR can provide a larger amount of information than LTR
because it is more likely that the close neighbors within the range of LTReq
messages may also never communicate with the unknown node.

Figure 4.2 An illustration of the trustworthiness request process.
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4.3.6 Trustworthiness Re-evaluation Process
The trustworthiness value of all intermediate nodes involved in network activities, i.e.,
data and control packets transmission and trustworthiness request, is calculated after a
transmission session. Let Si be the current transmission session and Si- 1 be the previous
transmission session. All nodes individually start re-evaluating the behaviors of other
nodes involved in the activity based on given criteria and error notifications. In this
chapter, the network activities are data transmission and trustworthiness request for the
sake of simplicity.
1) Trustworthiness reevaluation after data transmission
Assume all intermediate nodes are in the set of M I and any error-reporting nodes are in
the set ME, the sending and receiving nodes are represented as X and Y, respectively. Any
node keeps track of how many times the error notification messages sent by the same
observing node are proven to be faulty. The observing node may be regarded as
malicious if the ratio of the number of faulty error notification messages to the number of
correct error notification messages exceeds a certain number, called the false notification
threshold. Each node involved in the data transmission reevaluates each other nodes one
by one as depicted in Table 4.1:
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Table 4.1 Re-evaluation Scenarios

Reevaluated node
Sending node

Sending node

a)

-g

gn
ia
u
71 e
e

Receiving
node

Self

T— self
observed
R— combined
error reports

Receiving
node

T— self
observed
R— combined
error reports

Self

Intermediate
(forwarding)
node(s)

Observing
node(s)

T— self
observed, if
possible
R combined/
received error
reports

T— no
R— received
error reports

T— self
observed, if
possible
R combined/
received error
reports

T— no
R— received
error reports

Intermediate
(forwarding)
node(s)

T— self
observed, if
possible
R— received
error reports

T— self
observed, if
possible
R— received
error reports

T— self
observed, if
possible
R— received
error reports

T— no
R— received
error reports

Observing
node(s)

T— self
observed, if
possible
R— received
error reports

T— self
observed, if
possible
R— received
error reports

T— self
observed, if
possible
R— received
error reports

T— no
R— combined/
received error
reports

A. Case 1, a reevaluating node is a sending node. There are three possible reevaluations
as follows:
• A reevaluated node is the receiving node. The trust calculation gathers
information from self observations, and the reputation calculation gathers error
notification messages received by any nodes (i.e., observing nodes, intermediate
nodes, and, the receiving node itself—in case of maliciously denying the receipt
of packets). The new trustworthiness for the receiver is calculated as follows:
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•-•Si
New_ TWSi Y ,X = {αTSiY, X + βRSiY,e
Y, e ρ2{Old _TW Si-1 Y ,X } , where e E ME

•

A reevaluated node is an intermediate node. The trust calculation gathers
information from self observations if that is possible, and the reputation
calculation combines one or more error notification messages from multiple
observing nodes. The new trustworthiness for the intermediate node is calculated
as follows:
New TWS

•

i d,X =

p αTSi d ,X βRSi d, e p2 {

Old _TW Si-1 d, X } , where d E M „e

E ME

A reevaluated node is an observing node, say node E. The trust calculation may
be neglected since the sending node is likely not to observe the observing node at
that time, but the reputation calculation gathers multiple error notification
messages regarding the same error and determines whether the node E gives out
the notification accurately. The new trustworthiness for the observing node is
calculated as follows:
New _TW Es'x = ρ1{βRSiE, e} e l+ p2 {Old TW Si-1 E, X} , where e E

ME

n {E}

B. Case 2, a reevaluating node is a receiving node. There are three possible reevaluations
as follows:
•

A reevaluated node is the sending node. The trust calculation gathers information
from self observations, and the reputation calculation gathers the received error
notification messages. The new trustworthiness for the sender is calculated as
follow:
New _ TWSi X,Y = P1 {,Ts,X Y βRSi

S

X ,e}

+ p2
told _TW xst y-1 1, where e E ME'
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•

A reevaluated node is an intermediate node. The trust calculation gathers
information from self observations if that is possible, and the reputation
calculation combines one or more error notification messages from multiple
observing nodes. The new trustworthiness for the intermediate node is calculated
as follows:

•

A reevaluated node is an observing node, say node E. The trust calculation may
be neglected since the receiver is likely not to observe the observing node at that
time, but the reputation calculation gathers multiple error notification messages
regarding the same error and determines whether the node E gives out the
notification accurately. The new trustworthiness for the observing node is
calculated as follows:

C. Case 3, a reevaluating node is an intermediate (forwarding) node, say node D. There
are four possible reevaluations as follows:
•

A reevaluated node is the sending node. The trust calculation gathers information
from self observations if that is possible, and the reputation calculation combines
one or more error notification messages from multiple observing nodes. The new
trustworthiness for the sender is calculated as follows:
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•

A reevaluated node is the receiving node. The trust calculation gathers
information from self observations if that is possible, and the reputation
calculation combines one or more error notification messages from multiple
observing nodes. The new trustworthiness for the receiver is calculated as
follows:

•

A reevaluated node is another intermediate node. The trust calculation gathers
information from self observations if that is possible, and the reputation
calculation combines one or more error notification messages from multiple
observing nodes. The new trustworthiness for the intermediate node is calculated
as follows:

•

A reevaluated node is an observing node, say node E. The trust calculation may
be neglected since the receiver is likely not to observe the observing node at that
time, but the reputation calculation gathers multiple error notification messages
regarding the same error and determines whether the node E gives out the
notification accurately. The new trustworthiness for the observing node is
calculated as follow:
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D. Case 4, a reevaluating node is an observing node, say node E. There are four possible
reevaluations as follows:
•

A reevaluated node is the sending node. The trust calculation gathers information
from self observations if that is possible, and the reputation calculation combines
one or more error notification messages from other observing nodes. The new
trustworthiness for the sender is calculated as follows:

•

A reevaluated node is the receiving node. The trust calculation gathers
information from self observations if that is possible, and the reputation
calculation combines one or more error notification messages from other
observing nodes. The new trustworthiness for the receiver is calculated as
fed I ows:

•

A reevaluated node is an intermediate node, say node D. The trust calculation
gathers information from self observations if that is possible, and the reputation
calculation combines one or more error notification messages from other
observing nodes. The new trustworthiness for the sender is calculated as follows:

•

A reevaluated node is another observing node, say node E. The trust calculation
may be neglected since the receiver is likely not to observe the observing node at
that time, and the reputation calculation combines one or more error notification
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messages from other observing nodes. The new trustworthiness for the observing
node is calculated as follows:
New _X

TWSi X,E = ρ1{αTSi X {αTSi X, E βRSi X,e+ ρ2{Old _TWSi-¹ X, E} , where e e ME

The key idea is that the new possible trustworthiness value is an old trustworthiness value
plus a change in the trustworthiness value based on behaviors that are recently observed.

Trust and reputation values are calculated from the criteria as follows:

where WC, e [0,1] , e E ME , and J' is the set of reported errors.
•

If the reevaluating node observes no error, the trust value of the reevaluated node,
in this case n, becomes one. Similarly, if one critical error is observed, the trust
value for that node becomes zero. Non-critical errors yield lower trust values.

•

If the reevaluating node receives no error notification message, the reputation
value of the reevaluated node, in this case n, becomes one. Similarly, if one
critical error is observed, the reputation value for that node becomes zero. Noncritical errors also yield lower reputation values.

•

•

Summarily, with no error observed or reported, it is calculated as
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• Otherwise, the new trustworthiness value is calculated as

New

2)

i S TW
W reevaluated _node,reevaluating _node

Trustworthiness reevaluation after the trustworthiness request

After the node sent and received the LTREQ and GTREQ messages, it reevaluates the
trustworthiness values of the nodes of interest as follows:
• The reputation calculation combines all trustworthiness replies regarding the node
of interest, in this case, n.

The following Figure 4.3 illustrates the trustworthiness reevaluation process as
previously described.
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Figure 4.3 An illustration of the trustworthiness reevaluation process.

Once the new possible trustworthiness value of a node of interest is determined,
the value is tested by the trustworthiness update process to determine if the new possible
value is a result of attacks or any misbehavior. If the process does not find any suspicious
change in the trustworthiness value, the new possible trustworthiness value becomes the
new trustworthiness value. If any suspicious change is detected, the new possible
trustworthiness value is rejected. No update occurs then.

4.3.7 Trustworthiness Update Process
After the re-evaluation process, the node ensures that the change is not resulted from any
attacks, such as the defaming or collusion attacks. There are ways to detect attacks as
follows:
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1.

By checking the number of changes (both increasing and decreasing) that the

trustworthiness value varied in the past sessions.
•

If the number of changes fluctuates widely, that may indicate the node
associated with this trustworthiness value is under the intermittent disruptive
of service attack in which case that the attack takes place intermittently in a
short period of time.

•

If the number of changes (decreasing) occurs in a very short period of time,
that may indicate the node associated with this trustworthiness value is under
a defaming attack in which case the attack tries to rapidly decrease the
trustworthiness value of a specified victim.

•

If the number of changes (increasing) occurs in a very short period of time,
that may indicate the node associated with this trustworthiness value tries to
falsely increase its trustworthiness value.

2. By comparing the old values with the new ones of other nodes. If the difference is
less than the update threshold (, n,update), the node can update the trustworthiness value of
other nodes; otherwise, it rejects the update.

The trustworthiness update process can be depicted in the following figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 An illustration of the trustworthiness update process.

This dissertation suggests that the security policy should be only determined by
authorized entities to ensure that the attack detection mechanisms work properly and
universally to make the integration of the trust and reputation system more scalable.

4.3.8 Forecasting
There are several protocols that the proposed trust and reputation system can be
integrated, such as routing protocols. If the proposed system is integrated into a routing
protocol, the system enables several operations as follows: providing crucial information
to the routing protocol when selecting intermediate nodes on the forwarding path;
providing some probabilistic forecasts on possible behaviors of participating intermediate
nodes and outcomes of the transmission; and evaluating behaviors and updating
trustworthiness for each intermediate node along the forwarding path that helps
forwarding packets and properly follows the given routing protocols.
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To forecast the behaviors of participating entities, the proposed system uses the
probability model described in Appendix A to calculate some probabilistic forecasts on
the future activities, such as the probability of the successful transaction at the next
session in which all selected intermediate nodes are on the forwarding path, given past
recorded behaviors of those nodes, and the probability that one specified node will
provide a true recommendation on trustworthiness of a particular node.
The true recommendation of trustworthiness value of a node is the
recommendation given by the node that receives the trustworthiness request message, and
that recommendation resides in the majority number of all recommendations, which are
proceed through the trustworthiness reevaluation process and are eventually updated
through the trustworthiness update process. Otherwise, the false recommendations are
referred to two types of recommendations: the recommendation given by the node and
later resides in the minority number of all recommendations, or the recommendation
given by the node and resides in the majority number of all recommendations but fail to
be updated through the trustworthiness reevaluation and update processes.
The node that sends out the trustworthiness request packets keeps tracks of all
reply messages. If one or multiple of nodes continuously give out false recommendations
on a particular node that eventually lead to an isolation (a node is regarded as
untrustworthy) or a quickly increase of trustworthiness of that particular node, it is likely
that the system is under an attack from those nodes.
Based on the probability model in Appendix A, the probability that the next
transaction is successful in which node X originates and node Y forwards, base on given
past D records of n+p sessions, can be presented as Pr (TrSi+¹ XY = 11D) . Therefore, the
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probability of the successful transaction at the next session in which all intermediate
nodes are on the forwarding path can be calculated from

Similarly, node X can calculate the probability that the recommendation given by
node Y regarding the node of interest Z, based on given past G records of n+p
recommendations, can be presented as Pr (Tr s l

ni=Ss1refG),+wdhtoa¹l

recommendations and p as trust recommendations. If the probability is lower than a
certain level, node X may not send the trustworthiness request message to node Y and
may not include recommendations given by node Y into the trustworthiness reevaluation
process.

4.4

Threat Model against the Trust and Reputation System

This section discusses the threat models that aim not only to manipulate the processes and
operations of the trust and reputation system, but also to disrupt the availability and
credibility of the trust and reputation system. Defense mechanisms are also discussed in
this section.

4.4.1 Classifications of Attacks against the Trust and Reputation System
This dissertation explores several attack characteristics of attacking agents. The attacks
against trust and reputation systems in communication networks can be categorized in
multiple perspectives: motivations, approaches, collaboration, targets.

XY|Z
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A

Classification based on Motivations

Most trust and reputation systems outline threat models with two major attacks: selfish
attack and malicious attack.
A.1 Selfishness
In some networks where the network resources are very limited, the attack with a selfish
intention usually does not cause any malicious damages, but instead attempt to gain more
advantages over network resources, such as bandwidth. With the selfish intent, the
attacker is generally a single entity who does not perform proper actions, such as stop
forwarding packets, with respect to performance matters, i.e., saving power resources for
its own use. However, the attacker does not disrupt .the network activities or not violate
the integrity and confidentiality of the transversed packets. Despite, the attacker can
perform improper behaviors damaging the credibility of the trust and reputation system
that results in a higher trustworthiness value in favor of its benefits for future
transactions.
A.2 Malicious Intent
The attacks with any malicious intention can attempt to inflict damages not only to
network activities and packets transversed over the networks, but also to the trust and
reputation system. One of the objectives of this work is to not directly mitigate some
attacks against network activities, but to indirectly monitor such attacks and punish the
agents proportionally to the attacks such that every network entity recognizes that there is
a consequence to perform improper actions. This indirectly mitigates or reduces the
number of attacks against network activities and ensures the necessity of the trust
relationship among network entities. However, when the trust and reputation system is
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introduced, the system itself can be also the target for attacking agents who want to
manipulate the system to gain advantages or even to benefit in helping their attacks to be
more effective and inflict larger damages.

B

Classification based on Collaboration

This category consists of two groups based on a number of attacking agents.
2.1 Act-alone
There is physically a single attacking agent who plans the attack, collects information
before the attacks, and launches the attacks alone. However, it is also likely possible that
the physically single agent may create a number of fake entities, submit those fake
entities into the network, and manipulate or coordinate those entities to launch the attack.
The Sybil attack can be classified into this category by the fact that an agent may inject
the network with multiple entities and control them to deliberately launch other types of
attacks.
2.2. Collusion
Multiple attacking agents can collude with each other to launch attacks. It is possible that
not all attacking agents actively involved in the attacks. Some of these agents may
passively collect information regarding network activities or specific victims and relay
such information to the other agents who use the information to actively attack the
targets.

C

Classification based on Targets

The attacks can incur on the trust and reputation system, the information system, and
other layer protocols such as routing protocol or anonymous protocol.
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4.4.2 Attacks on the Trust and Reputation System
This attack targets either the trustworthiness value or the trust and reputation system.

A Attacks on the Trustworthiness Value
An attacking agent in this kind generally attempts to manipulate or build an influence into
the trustworthiness reevaluation process and update process to either increase the
trustworthiness value of its target, i.e., itself or its colluded agent, or decrease the
trustworthiness value of its target, i.e., a specific victim. There are two attacks that are
categorized in this group: self-promoting and defaming. This work discusses the details
of the two attacks and investigates scenarios that an attacking agent can do to achieve the
anticipated result.
-

Selfpromoting attack
-

The goal of this attack is to increase the trustworthiness values in two ways: by
replying trustworthiness request messages and falsely exaggerating the higher-than-actual
trustworthiness value, with or without help from its colluded agents; and by giving falsely
satisfactory observation messages to help its colluded agents gain the higher-than-actual
trustworthiness values.
-

Defaming (or slander) attack

The attacking agent attempts to defame victims in two ways: by sending route
error messages to falsely accuse victims of performing improper actions such that the
victims' trustworthiness values are decreased; and by falsely replying trustworthiness
request messages about a victim with a lower-than-actual trustworthiness value. This kind
of attack is usually effective when a sufficient number of agents collude with each other
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to target one or more victims because the agents become a majority in manipulating the
trustworthiness of these victims.

B

Attacks on Services of the Trust and Reputation System
This type of attack generally causes a questionable problem on reliability, and

availability of services offered by the system. An attacking agent in this kind simply
disrupts the services to create an impression of all entities that the system is simply not
trustworthy to be relied on. In addition, the agent may try to attack the trustworthiness
values of unspecified victims to demonstrate that some or all services, such as
trustworthiness reevaluation, update, and request processes, are easy to be deceived and
manipulated. Once network entities experienced such a drawback or weakness of the
system, the entities simply no longer employ the trust and reputation system.
- Selective Disruption of Service
An attacking agent selectively discards trustworthiness request and replies
messages that are originated from or destined to a specific victim such that the victim
cannot update its trustworthiness cache.
- Intermittent Disruption of Service
An attacking agent performs malicious actions for some periods of time, with one
or multiple strategies, and once the trustworthiness value starts to decline to the certain
value, such as the blacklist threshold, the agent performs proper actions for the other
periods of time to regain the reputation value. Once the agent's reputation value rises to
be sufficiently high, the agent performs malicious actions again.
- Low-rate Disruption of Service
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Similar to the intermittent disruption of service, the attacking agents perform
malicious actions for a very short period of time, through one or multiple strategies, that
target specific victims and proper actions for a long period of time. It is difficult to detect
such behavior in distributed networks, such as ad hoc networks, without central authority
that consecutively monitor and constantly detect such behavior.
- Re-entry attack
The attacking agent performs malicious actions until its trustworthiness value
drops below the certain value, i.e., blacklist threshold, and it is completely ignored by the
other nodes in the network. Thereafter, the agent changes its identity and re-enters the
network to perform malicious actions again.

4.4.3 Attacks on the Information System
This attack focuses on information that is being transmitted throughout the network.
There are basically two types of packets: control packets and data packets. Some attacks
may attempt to disrupt the protocol or system by blocking control packets, modifying
contents in control packets, or injecting false contents or fake control packets. Some other
attacks may instead target data packets without disrupting the protocol or system. The
contents in the data packets are the main target that the attackers are after. The other
attacks may aim at both control and data packets to concurrently achieve multiple goals.

4.4.4 Attacks on Other Protocols or Applications
This type of attack varies depending on the protocol or application into which the trust
and reputation system is applied, such as routing protocol or anonymous protocol. The
attack exploits weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the implementation of the trust and
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reputation system on the other protocol. Therefore, the defense techniques must be
developed dependently because one defense technique effectively works well on one
applied protocol may not work at all if the same technique is applied onto another
protocol.

Figure 4.5 A Classification of Attacks.

CHAPTER 5
ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM-BASED GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT
FOR SECURE GROUP COMMUNICATIONS
5.1

Objective

Group key management (GKM) prevents all non-membership users from acquiring the
group key to decrypt the encrypted messages broadcasted among group members. This
chapter expands the utilization of elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) into GKM to
decrease the key lengths while providing securities at the same level as that of other
cryptosystems, and propose the cluster scheme to make the key management more
efficient. A group is divided into smaller groups, called clusters, which are independent
from each other particularly in the operations of key management. The cluster key is used
to secure the selection and distribution of a group key while the group key is used to
encrypt broadcast messages. When a membership changes, only the corresponding cluster
and its cluster key and a fraction of the group key are changed, thereby reducing the key
computation and decreasing time for group key management.

5.2

Introduction

In general, existing GKM protocols can be categorized into three classes [41]-[47]:
centralized, decentralized, and distributed. The centralized based GKM protocols perform
a key selection and distribution through a central authority, which may potentially be the
cause of a point of failure. The distributed based GKM protocols enable all group
members to fully establish the group key without a central authority so that every
member contributes a corresponding part to the group key, but the members are required
to store all related information and to compute the group key themselves. The
102
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decentralized based GKM protocols select temporarily any group member to act as a
central authority for key selection and distribution. In this chapter, a hybrid of
decentralized and centralized based schemes is introduced to place a central coordinator
to keep most of group information, and to establish the group key in a distributed manner.
The public key cryptosystem ensures the security of key distribution for the
symmetric key cryptosystem, but the public key cryptosystem itself incurs high
computational intensity. Therefore, a mix of public key and symmetric cryptosystems is
introduced where the public key cryptosystem is used for key distribution and
authentication, and the symmetric key cryptosystem is used for message encryption. ECC
is a public key cryptosystem and considered to have several major advantages of smaller
key length and more efficient computations over other public key cryptosystems, such as
discrete logarithm based cryptosystems (i.e., Diffie-Hellman) or factorization based
cryptosystems (i.e., RSA), while it provides the same security level [47]-[56]. Thus, it
may be deployed particularly in networks where the devices, such as chips embedded in
smart cards, have limited resources such as CPU power, processing time, and storage.
The contributions of this chapter include:
1. This work proposes to utilize the elliptic curve cryptosystem for group key
management such that the group key is securely selected, rekeyed, and distributed in
group communications with a shorter key length but provides the same security level as
that of other cryptosystems.
2. This work proposes the cluster scheme for GKM to decrease the processing time and
key computations.
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5.3

Background Information

5.3.1 Elliptic Curve
An Elliptic Curve E is defined by two variables, x and y, and a Weierstrass equation as
follows:
Ax+B, +

³

=

³

y

where A and B are constant coefficients, and a set of A, B, x, y is an element of a field. In
this paper, the field is a finite field for a prime p, and the coefficients must satisfy the
condition:
4A³ +27B 2 # 0 .
Below are several properties related to the elliptic curve that can be adapted and
used in the elliptic curve cryptosystem, and only those that are deployed in this ECCGKM scheme are presented. The complete details of elliptic curve and number theory are
covered in Reference [48].
4.1 Two Points addition. The group law enables the operations for adding together two
points P =(xp,

yp

) and Q =(xQ,

yQ

) on the elliptic curve, resulting in the third point

R = (xR , y E ) on the same elliptic curve, defined as P+ E Q=R, where + E denotes the
point addition operation and neither point is a point at infinity (00). The third point's
coordinates can be calculated from Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 The Point Addition Properties [3]

4.2 Existence of inverses. Given the point P , there exists an inverse point P' , which is
basically a reflection of P across the x-axis, such that P + E= 00 . Therefore, the
inverse point P' is also denoted as _P . For the Weierstrass equation, given
P = (x,,, y p ) , the inverse point of P is defined as P' —P (xp,-

yp ).

Thus,

a(P)+ E a(P')= a(P)+E . a(—P)= 00 .

4.3 Existence of identity. Given the point P , the identity property is determined as
P F 00 = P .

4.4 Endomorphism of curve E. Given two points PI and P2 , a (Pi + E. P2 ) = a (P1 )- + E (P2 ) .
4.5 Associativity.
( P1 + E P2) + E P³

Given

any

three

points

PI , P2 , P3on

curve

E,

+ I; ( P2 + E P³) •

4.6 Commutativity. Given any two points PI , P2 on curve E, P, + E P2 = P2 +- P .
4.7 Point multiplying with integer. When a point multiplies with a positive integer, a, the
outcome aP can be found by repeatedly adding itself a times, which is very expensive for
a large integer. The successive doubling operation can be instead used to improve the
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efficiency of multiplication particularly when the integer is very large, as follows:
P

E

P = 2P, 2P + E 2P = 4P, 4P + E 4P = 8P,4P +

P =5P .

E

4.8 Modulation. All operations are in deed modulated by prime p, but for simplicity, the
expression (mod p) is not shown in this dissertation.
This chapter proposes the elliptic curve cryptosystem based key management by
utilizing the above properties. For examples, it follows from Properties 1, 2, and 7 that
a(P)+ E 411+

E

b(P) =-- a(P)+ E a(-P) +

E

b(P)
b(P)=-

E

+

∞

=

and from Properties 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 that
(Pi +E P2) + E P³ + E P'2

= ( PI + E P2)

+ E P2 + E P³

= P1 +E (P2+E P2')+E P³

= P 1+ E

P3·

5.3.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC)
The elliptic curve has been applied in cryptography [49]. The security of ECC relies on
the strength of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). ECDLP is to find
the secret PIN (positive integer) a, given points Q and P, whereas Q= a(P).
The two users agree on the elliptic curve E and point P. User A randomly
generates the secret PIN a multiplied by the point P, thus creating its public key a(P),
along with information of curve E and point P. Upon the receipt of A's public key, user B
randomly generates the secret PIN b multiplied by the given point P to create its public
key bP, and sends the public key back to user A. Consequently, users A and B calculates
the group key of which only they know by multiplying their secret PIN a and b with B's
public key aP and A's public key as b(aP)=baP and a (bP) = abP baP , respectively,
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as illustrated in Figure 5.1. This group key ab(P) is used to encrypt and decrypt the
messages transmitted between them.

Select a point Pon a curve E over field F
Randomly select A's secret a
Compute A's public keya
I Point P. curve E, field F, A's public key a (P)
Randomly select B's secret h
Compute B's public keyb (1 3 )
B's Public key b (P)
Compute a public key a (b(P)) a(b(P)) Compute a public keyb(a(P))

=

a(b(P))

Figure 5.1 An illustration of the ECC-based key exchange [3].
In ECC, a message can be encrypted in two ways: embedding the message into a
point, PM , , on curve

E(Fq

) [50], and bitwise operations such as exclusive-OR (XOR)

operation. The embedding of a message simply transforms the message string onto a
point of the given elliptic curve.

5.3.3 Key Management Schemes in Group Communications
The key management is a big and fundamental part of many group communications
schemes that offer security properties such as access control, authentication, integrity,
and so on. A strong key management scheme consists of four major parts: key selection,
key distribution, membership management, and rekeying management. The key selection
should be executed to provide the strong group key and the key distribution should be
carried out through secure channels such that only current members can access the group
key. The membership management is also another major part of the key management.

1 08
When there is a change in membership, i.e., when one member leaves or one new
member joins in, the group key should be rekeyed to assure its secrecy and to ensure two
properties: forward secrecy and backward secrecy. The forward secrecy assures that a
former member cannot use the old group key to decrypt the messages encrypted with the
new group key. The backward secrecy assures that the new group member cannot use the
new group key to decrypt the messages encrypted with the old group key, assuming that
those messages have been previously intercepted by the new member. This is illustrated
in Figure 5.2. The periodic rekeying assures that the group key is secure by periodically
changing the group key after a session ends. After the rekeying operation, the two keys
should be independent, i.e., the new key is independent of the old key.
Backward Secrecy

Figure 5.2 An illustration of the key secrecy.

There are several issues on the membership management, including which entity
to keep track of the membership status and which entity to respond to the member's
malicious behavior, as discussed in Reference 1471. Three major schemes have been
proposed in order to handle the membership status: centralized schemes in which the
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central authority keeps the whole information; distributed schemes in which each
member keeps the whole information; and fully distributed schemes in which each
member keeps a part of the whole information. The centralized scheme is suitable for the
scenario in which the least information is required to be stored in each member.

5.3.4 Cluster Based Group Key Management
In the ECC-GKM scheme, the group is divided into smaller groups, called clusters. There
are two communication levels: group level and cluster level, as illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Group messages are broadcasted throughout the group and secured by the group key
while cluster messages are broadcasted within the cluster and secured by the cluster key.
Let N be the total number of group members, and M be the number of cluster members in
each cluster; there will be 1 N/M] clusters, assuming that each cluster has the same
-

number of members. Let {M} and

{[ N/M]}

be sets of indices for all cluster members in

a cluster and for all cluster heads in a group, respectively.

Figure 5.3 Two levels of communications [3].
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The cluster head is selected by the coordinator among cluster members to perform
the managerial tasks. The cluster head position is held for one session and can be
renewed if the coordinator is not reassigned to another cluster member and if the cluster
head is still within the same cluster. The coordinator assigns the session period to the
cluster head. The coordinator supplies the cluster head with a list of candidate cluster
points, and the cluster head picks one of those to be its cluster point so that the cluster
point P for each cluster may not necessarily be the same. The coordinator is the
authorized entity that performs the following: generates the elliptic curve E, the group
point Q, and a set of candidate cluster points; authenticates the new users and assigns
them to the clusters; supplies the new members with appropriate information, and
communicates with the cluster heads; and stores a list of cluster members and a part of
the cluster key for each cluster.

5.4 ECC-based Key Management Scheme
There are two shared keys in the ECC-GKM scheme:
1.The group key is used to encrypt and decrypt the messages broadcasted among the
group members.
2.The cluster key is used to encrypt and decrypt the cluster-level messages broadcasted to
all cluster members.
Consequently, the key management in the ECC-GKM scheme can be separated
into two groups: a cluster key establishment and a group key establishment.

5.4.1 The Cluster Key Establishment

Adapted from a protocol without member serialization in large networks [46], the cluster
members are not necessarily numbered serially and the process of generating the cluster
key may not be in serial as required in other key management schemes such as group
Diffie-Hellman (GDH) protocols. The cluster key can be established within two rounds,
as shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4 A cluster key establishment [3].

In the first round, each cluster member m, randomly selects a cluster session PIN
S,, computes a cluster session key S, (P), and broadcasts {S, (P),mi } to all other
cluster members. Upon receipt of the cluster session key from mj for
Vj, j = i i j E {M}, the pair-wise cluster session key is computed as S, (S, (P)) for
,

,

every other cluster member. Note that the cluster head denotes C as its index and
C E {M} . Thus, the cluster head also computes its cluster session key S, (S, (P)) for
E {{M} _C} . In the second round, each cluster member m, selects its cluster secret
PIN Z,, computes its cluster public key Z, (P), encrypts it with the pair-wise cluster
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session key

S, (Sj (P)) [Z; (P), in,] for Vj, j = i, i, j e {M} , and unicasts

5Si, (Sl (P))[Z, (P),m i ]

S, (SM (P))[Z, (P), m i l to corresponding members.

Similarly, the cluster head also computes its cluster public key and encrypts it with the
pair-wise cluster session key as Sc (S, (0[4 (P), Inc ] for Vi,i E {{M} C} . Each
_

cluster member including the cluster head decrypts these encrypted cluster public keys by
(S, (P))[Sj

(S, (P))[Zj (P), /7j ]1 for Vj, j = i, i, j E {M} , retrieves every cluster

public key Z1 (P) for Vj, j = i, i, j e {M} , and computes a cluster key via some predefined function f (Z (P) j) such as f (Z (P) Vj) = Z1 (P) + E + E ZM (13 ) . The
cluster key of the Ith cluster is

KC, = (P) E . . . + E Zm (P).
Once the cluster key has been established, the cluster head sends a part of the
cluster key to the coordinator as
KC, _4(P)--= Z1(P)

+E

...+E ZM-1 (P).

5.4.2 The Group Key Establishment
After the cluster key is established, the cluster head notifies the coordinator, which then
sends the communication halt notification to all cluster heads and subsequently to all
group members. The process of the group key establishment is similar to that of the
cluster key establishment by comparing the cluster keys as a cluster public key and the
cluster header as a cluster member. The hierarchical cluster presented in Reference [46] is
partially adapted but the main differences are that there are only two layers, one for the
cluster level and another for the group level communications such that it is lightweight,
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and the key computations are executed by the group members to avoid the single point of
failure in case the key server is attacked. The group key can be established within two
rounds.

Figure 5.5 A group key establishment [3].

In the first round, each cluster head moo for Vi, i E {[N/M]} randomly selects a
group session PIN S oo , multiplied by its cluster key KC, =(x C(i), yC(i)) to generate its
group session key Soo (KC, ), and then broadcast {S oo (KC, ), m oo } to all other cluster
heads Vj, j = i , i , j e {[N/M]} . Upon receipt of the group session key from other cluster
heads moil for Vj, j = i , i , j E {[N/M]} , the cluster head computes the pair-wise group
session key Soo (S( (o (KC ( )) for Vj, j = i j e {[N/M]} . In the second round, each
,

cluster head selects its group secret PIN Z . , , computes its group public key Z oo (Q),
(

(

)

encrypts it with the pair-wise group session keys Soo (SC(j) (KC / ))[,5( (0 (Q), m oo ] for
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Vj, j = i, j

,

and unicasts it to corresponding cluster heads. Any cluster head

Inc(?) decrypts these encrypted group public keys by

Sc (,) (SC(j)(KCj

))[SC(i)(SC( i ) (KC, ))[ZC(j) (Qs), In c( j) 11, retrieves each group public key

, {[ /

ZC(j) (Q) for vj, j = i, i j e N M

]}

,

and computes a group key as

KG = co)
Z (Q)+ E ••• + E Z C([N/M])(Q)

Denote mC(L) as the cluster head of cluster L, and Figure 5.5 illustrates the group
key establishment operation. Each cluster head encrypts the group key with its cluster
key, KC; [KG] for Vi, i e

,

and broadcasts the encrypted group key to its

cluster members. The cluster members decrypt it with the cluster key and retrieve the
group key.
Once the group and clusters have been established, there can be three incidents: a
new user requested to join, a current cluster member requested to leave, and a cluster
head requested to leave. These membership-changed rekeying operations are to assure
that the forward and backward secrecies are intact, as discussed below:

5.4.3 Individual Join
The new user, mX , submits the joining request to the coordinator, which sends back
information, such as curve E, and points P, Q, in which the new user is referred by the
index X e {M} . The user who wants to join the group starts the individual joining
processes as follows. The user sends the coordinator a request along with its identity. The
coordinator authenticates the request whether the user actually sends the request. Note
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that this step may be carried out off-line. A coordinator's public key is issued to the new
user that will be used to decrypt the messages sent from the coordinator during the new
cluster head selection process, which will be discussed shortly. In addition, the new
member also issues its pair-wise key to the coordinator that will be used by the
coordinator to decrypt the messages sent from this new member in the future. The
coordinator also sends the user information, including curve E, point P, field F,,, cluster
ID to which the user will be assigned, cluster head ID, and part of the existing cluster key
KC B —Z( (P) Z, (P)+ 1, ... + E ZM-1 (P). Simultaneously, the coordinator notifies the
cluster head of the new cluster member to start the cluster key and group key rekeying
operations. Subsequently, the cluster head issues a communication halt notification to its
existing members. The cluster key rekeying operation for the joining member can be
executed within two rounds to guarantee the backward secrecy. Figure 5.6 illustrates the
cluster key rekeying operation when the new member joins in.

Figure 5.6 A cluster key rekeying operation when the new member joins in.
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In the first round, the cluster head unicasts the list of cluster session keys,

I S, (P), m; for Vi, i e {{M} —C} that are used by other cluster members, to the new
member. Concurrently, the new member randomly selects a cluster session PIN SX ,
computes a cluster session key SX (P) , and broadcasts {S X (P),m X } for Vj, j e {M} to
all current cluster members, including the cluster head. In the second round, upon receipt
of the m X 's cluster session key, the cluster head and other cluster members compute the
pair-wise cluster session key, 5', (S X (P)| for Vi, i e {M} , used between themselves and
the new member. Similarly, the new member computes the pair-wise cluster session keys,
SX(P)), for Vj, j e {M} . Then, the cluster head selects its new cluster secret PIN
Zr ", computes its new cluster public key Z r " (P) , encrypts it with every pair-wise

cluster session keys SC (Sk (P)|[ZC n (P), me for V k,lf- e {{{M} —C} u X} , which
]

includes every member and the new member, and unicasts them. Similarly, the new
member selects its cluster secret PIN ZX , computes its cluster public key Zx (P) , and
encrypts it with every pair-wise cluster session keys SX(P))[ZX (P), m X for
Vj, j e {M} , and broadcasts them. Existing cluster members obtain {4" (P),mC } in
addition to {Z.j (P),mj }bj, j e {{M} - , which is also obtained by the cluster head,
while
(P),

the

new

member

obtains

all

cluster

public

keys

Vj, j e {{M} — CI 44" (P), mC. . Eventually, the new cluster key can be

derived as follows:
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KC"L = (KC +

E

(Pi) +

E

Z

Cff

= (Z (P) + E + E ZM-2 _ 2 (P)

(P) +
+E

E

Z

X

(P)

Z (P)| + E (—P) +EZC" (P) + Z (P)

= Z (P) + E + E ZM-2 _ 2 (P) + E ZX (P)

+E(P)

Note that all cluster members always keep the cluster head's cluster public key in
order to obtain ZC ZC (—P), where an inverse point P' is a reflection of P across
the x-axis, such that P + E P' = cc . Therefore, the inverse point P' is also denoted as —P .
The cluster head updates the coordinator with the new cluster key as

KCL — ZC (P) = Z1 (11 + E + E ZM-1 _ 1 (11 . Therefore, the coordinator keeps the cluster key
from which the cluster head's cluster public key is subtracted, rather than the actual
cluster key. During this cluster key rekeying operation, the group key is still unchanged
and used by all other clusters. Since the cluster key KCL is changed to KC: , the group
key must be consequently updated to support the backward secrecy. The cluster head of
membership-changed cluster, mC(L) , randomly selects a new group session PIN S "C(L) ,
computes a new group session key S"C(L)(KCL "), and broadcasts it to other cluster heads.
This cluster head mC(L) also selects a new group secret PIN Z"C(L)
computes a new group
public key Z"C(L) (Q) , and encrypts it with a new group session key such that
S"C(L) (Sol) (KCj ))[Z"C(L)(Q),mC(L)1 for Vi, e

_L} , and unicasts them to

other corresponding cluster heads. Upon receipt of this new group session key, every
other cluster head mC(i)) computes a new pair-wise group session key So) (S"C(L) (KC"L))
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for Vi, i e {{{[N/m]}-L}. Every other cluster head also decrypts this encrypted new
group public key and computes the new group key, derived as

Every cluster head updates the new group key to their cluster members. Figure 5.7
illustrates the group key rekeying operation when the new member joins in.

Figure 5.7 A group key rekeying operation when the new member joins in.

5.4.4 Individual Departure

When the cluster member leaves the group, the leaving member should be considered
whether it is the cluster member or the cluster head. To ensure the forward secrecy, the
cluster key used in the cluster to which the leaving member belongs must be changed so
that the leaving member cannot decrypt future messages broadcasted within the cluster,
and the group key must be changed so that the leaving member cannot decrypt future
messages encrypted with the current group key. When the cluster head detects any
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change in the individual membership, the cluster head issues the communication halt
notification to all cluster members, and starts to establish the new cluster key. In addition,
the cluster head reports this membership change to the coordinator, which sends the
group key change notification to all other cluster heads. Subsequently, other cluster heads
issue the communication halt notification to their cluster members along with the
temporary group key, which is defined as

Therefore, communications among other clusters are still active by using this
temporary group key until the new group key is rekeyed. Since only the cluster that the
membership changed is affected, the overall performance of group communications is
improved.
The cluster key rekeying operation for the leaving member can be executed in the
same way the cluster key is established. The main difference is that the leaving member
is not included. The new cluster key can be derived as

The cluster head randomly selects a random secret PIN R C(L) , computes
Rc(L)

(P) , and reports the membership change and part of the new cluster key,

{ RC(L) (P), m y , KC': - Z' (P)} , to the coordinator. This report is encrypted with the
coordinator's public key so that only the coordinator with the session PIN key can
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decrypt the message. The coordinator updates the list of cluster members for this cluster
and sends an acknowledgement back to the cluster head, encrypted with
RC(L) ( P)[{mY}]• The group key rekeying operation for the leaving member is derived in
the same manner of the group key rekeying operation for the joining member, which
yields the new group key as

5.4.5 Cluster Head Departure
When the cluster head is leaving, it must notify the coordinator so that the coordinator
begins a new cluster head selection process. The cluster head randomly selects a random
secret PIN RC(L), computes RC(L) (P), and encrypts {RC(L) (P), mC(L) } with the
coordinator's public key. The cluster head also sends the communications halt
notification to all cluster members. The coordinator may select the new cluster head by
the trust and reputation approach, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. After the
coordinator selects the new cluster head, the selection notification, encrypted with the
coordinator's session PIN key and signed by the coordinator, is multicast to the selected
member and the leaving cluster head. The leaving cluster head verifies whether it is
authentic and then makes the transition notification broadcasted to all cluster members
along with the new cluster head identification. The rekeying operations begin to obtain
the new cluster key and the group key.
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5.4.6 Periodic Rekeying
The cluster key is changed to safeguard its secrecy regardless of the membership status.
Note that the session period for each cluster may not be the same because the periodic
rekeying operation is executed concurrently for all clusters. If the coordinator does not
select the new cluster head and the old cluster head is still in the cluster, the old cluster
head automatically inherits the cluster head position. The periodic rekeying operation
starts when the coordinator broadcasts the periodic rekeying notification to all cluster
heads, which then broadcast the communication halt notification to their cluster
members. The cluster key and group key rekeying processes are similar to those of the
cluster key and group key establishment operations that were previously discussed.

5.5 ECC-based GKM Analysis
The performance key establishment operation and rekeying operation of the ECE-GKM
scheme is summarized in Table 5.2, in terms of the following parameters as in Reference
[45]: the number of rounds, the number of messages sent to and received by any member,
and the number of "point multiplication with integer" operations. Note that, in Table 5.2,
0 means null, and ms can be either the new joining member m X or the leaving member

my . In the ECC-GKM scheme, the key independence property is true because only
portions of group keys contributed by the membership-changed clusters are replaced. The
ECC-GKM scheme offers both forward and backward secrecy in key establishment and
rekeying operations. Unlike other cryptosystems such as the GDH scheme, ECC-GKM
does not require a member serialization in the two operations such that none of the
members needs to wait for each other to configure the keys, but time synchronization

122
among the members is required to respond promptly to the membership changed. The
memory used by each member is reduced from the group level to the cluster level,
thereby reducing the memory requirement, as shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 The Performance of Key Establishment in the ECC-GKM Protocol [3]
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5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, ECC is incorporated into GKM to decrease the key length while
providing the same security level as that of other cryptosystems, and adapt the cluster
based key management scheme to make the ECC-GKM scheme more efficient. A group
is separated into several clusters, which are independent from each other, particularly in
the operations of key management. The cluster key is used to secure the group key
selection and distribution while the group key is used to encrypt broadcast messages.
When there is a membership change, the corresponding cluster key and the group key are
changed in order to protect their secrecies. The periodic rekeying operation also
strengthens the key secrecies.

CHAPTER 6
ADAPTIVE TRUST-BASED ANONYMOUS NETWORK
6.1 Objective
A novel adaptive trust-based anonymous network (ATAN) is proposed. The distributed
and decentralized network management in ATAN does not require a central authority so
that ATAN alleviates the problem of a single point of failure. In some existing anonymous
networks, packets are routed onto intermediate nodes anonymously without knowing
whether these nodes are trustworthy. On the other hand, an intermediate node should
ensure that packets which it forwards are not malicious, and it will not be allegedly
accused of involving in the attack. To meet these objectives, the intermediate node only
forwards packets received from the "trusted" predecessor, which can be either the source
or another intermediate node.
In ATAN, the proposed trust and reputation model aims to enhance anonymity by
establishing a trust and reputation relationship between the source and the forwarding
members. The trust and reputation relationship of any two nodes is adaptive to new
information learned by these two nodes or recommended from other trust nodes.
Therefore, packets are anonymously routed from the "trusted" source to the destination
through "trusted" intermediate nodes, thereby improving anonymity of communications.

6.2 Introduction
In recent years, security and privacy issues in communication networks receive
considerable attention and many schemes have been proposed to achieve several
objectives. One objective is to make the communications anonymous with several
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properties: source anonymity, destination anonymity, and unlinkability between the
source and destination. Anonymous networks can be managed in a centralized or
distributed manner [57]-[73]. Many centralized anonymous networks, such as PENET
[58], have been targeted by the attacker who seeks to obtain the identification of the
sender and receiver nodes and other pertinent information, and by authorities who want to
force the network administrator to shut down the network services or to turn over users'
information. In this chapter, a framework of the adaptive trust-based anonymous network
(ATAN) is proposed to provide anonymous communications based on the proposed trust
and reputation model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.3 gives a theoretical
background of some previous research on anonymous network protocols and discrete
logarithm problem-based cryptosystems. Section 6.4 presents the framework of ATAN.
Section 6.5 discusses the threat model. Section 6.6 offers a brief network analysis,
followed by the conclusion and future work in Section 6.7.

6.3 Background Information

A brief overview on anonymous network protocols as well as the cryptosystems based on
the discrete logarithm problem is discussed.
6.3.1 Anonymous Networks

The path routing approach in anonymous protocols can be classified into fixed-length
path or variable-length path approaches. The fixed-length path approach requires the
sender node to know a priori the network topology such that intermediate nodes along
the path can be chosen before the sender's packet is transmitted. This approach also
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needs to determine parameters for path selection such as the number of hops in order to
fix the path length. The major drawbacks of this approach include the requirement of the
knowledge of the whole network topology for path selection, and the large overhead
required for packet encryption for all intermediate nodes. The variable-length path
approach defines the path length as a random variable that uses the probabilistic
algorithm to determine whether the packet is forwarded among the members or sent
directly to the destination node. Its major drawback is the intensive computation.
Some anonymous network protocols have proposed various concepts of the trust
and reputation model in the peer-to-peer networks [62]-[66].

6.3.2 Diffie-Hellman Cryptosystem
Diffie and Hellman [74] proposed the Diffie-Hellman (DH) cryptosystem to securely
exchange keys between two or more users, and its security strength depends on the
discrete logarithm (DL) problem, as illustrated in Figure 6.1.

creates a secret key x ,4
2. A calculates a public key
1. A

nA = (mod p)
and sends to B.
3. A calculates a shared key

k=

e" ( mod p)
)

1. B creates a secret key x B
2. B calculates a public key

= =gxB (mod p)

and sends to A.
3. B calculates a shared key

k=g B

X (xA)

(mod p)

4. B encrypts a message M

5. A decrypts a message M

M x k and sends to A.

Figure 6.1 An illustration of the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem [4].
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The cryptosystem has two system parameters: p, a large prime number selected
from the finite field Fp , and g, an integer number less than p. The discrete logarithm
problem is to compute the shared key K or the secret keys X A and X B , given the public
keys kX and kXB . The DH cryptosystem is also utilized in group communications [47],
[61], [74]476]. EIGamal [75] proposed the EIGamal public key cryptosystem by
converting the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem into a public key cryptosystem as illustrated
in Figure 6.2.

1. A creates a secret key xA
2. A calculates a public key
3. B creates a corresponding
secret key RB and two keys

nA = (mod p)

nB = ( g RB)( mod p)
pkB = ((nA)RB )(mod p)

5. A calculates a decrypting key

pk A = ((nB)nA)(mod

= g

)

B)( R A n

(mod

4. B encrypts a message M
M x pkB (mod p) and sends
a pair (M x pkB ,nB ) to A.

p)
g

and decrypts a message M.
Figure 6.2

An illustration of the ElGamal cryptosystem.

.
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6.4 ATAN Framework
The ATA (adaptive trust-based anonymous) protocol is an application-layer protocol, but
sits below other application-layer protocols. From a network point of view, a network
that deploys the ATA protocol is called an ATA network (ATAN). ATAN sits on top of
the existing core networks and has a virtual topology connecting all members together.
From the network management point of view, ATAN can be viewed as a loosely
decentralized network because all members are grouped into clusters, each managed by a
cluster head. There is no central authority that can become a potential single point of
failure. The cluster head is changed periodically to tighten the security and to share the
administrative responsibility among members.
ATAN uses any underlying routing protocols to route the packets from one
intermediate node to another through the physical path (one node represents a router) in
the core network, but the path established by ATAN is basically a logical path above the
physical path (one node represents a member). Therefore, the terms "node" and
"member" will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter.
This work also extends the concept of group key management and proposes the
trust and reputation system and the voting protocol for anonymous networks such that
anonymity is insured [47], [62].
Several major advantages of ATAN include:
1. ATAN utilizes the trust and reputation model to enhance anonymity because the
packets are routed among "trusted" members in decentralized networks where there is
no central authority to control and detect malicious members.
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2. ATAN is scalable by dividing the network into smaller clusters based on a trust and
reputation value such that the users join and leave ATAN without creating a big
impact on the rest of the network while maintaining high anonymity.
3. The large number of members increases anonymity by hiding packets among the
members and camouflaging packets among other unspecified packets. The proposed
trust and reputation system encourages the well-behaved users to stay longer and to
help forwarding other members' packets, rather than to send their packets and then
leave, because they will have in return higher anonymity for their own packets.
4. ATAN uses a voting protocol to share the responsibility of managing the cluster
among cluster members to defend against a malicious insider attack.

6.4.1 Terminologies, Definitions, Expressions, and Assumptions
To illustrate the concept of ATAN, some details including terminologies, definitions,
expressions and assumptions, are first outlined.

6.4.1.(a)

Terminologies

The following terminologies are defined.
Z A set of all existing members in each cluster, Z = {1,..., N} .
N MAX N MIN The maximum and minimum number of members in each cluster,
respectively.
R A set of all existing clusters in ATAN, R =
M}
MME The maximum number of clusters in ATAN.
•h
n (i, j) A representation of the z t node in the j th cluster, i e Z, j e R , called
node ID.
Note that every cluster head always has 1=1 , also represented as
n(C, j)
•

C(n) A representation of the cluster to which node n belongs.
y
The average trust and reputation (ATR) value of node B known to node
A.

A
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Z A set of all existing members in each cluster, Z {1, ..., N} .
ηC(n), ηj The ATR threshold of the cluster to which node n belongs, and that of
the! cluster, respectively.
,

yC(n) 7J

of the

The average ATR value of the cluster to which node n belongs, and that

jth cluster, respectively.

Xn ,kXn A private key and a public key of node n, respectively.
U The set of all entries in the ATR database of each
member,. U = {(l,1) _, (N, M)}
5

The initial time when the cluster head of the jth cluster is selected.
z The constant lifecycle for every cluster.
t (i, j) The timestamp of node n (i, j)' s ATR value kept in the ATR database.
tQThe timeout for the query packet.
tj
-

B The maximum number of digests in the probing packet.
HO The hash function.
change

Y

The old value of Y is replaced by its new value Y .

6.4.1.(b) Definitions

The source node is defined as the end node that generates and sends out packets, and the
destination node as the end node to which packets are ultimately destined. The sender
node may not generate packets but sends out packets to the other end on the link. The
receiver node receives packets from the other end on the link but may or may not be the
ultimate destination.
6.4.1.(c) Expressions

To simplify the process proposed throughout the chapter, each process is expressed in
five parts: command name, a pair of sender node and receiver node, a descriptive set of
the pair, condition or reason, and packet type, defined as:
COMMAND NAME (SENDER, RECEIVER)|NODE SET : CONDITION / REASON](PACKET_ TYPE)
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The expression is interpreted as the receiver node performs a command on the
packet received from the sender node, and any sender-receiver pair applicable to the
command is described in the node_set part.
The command name indicates how to deal with the packet, of which there are
three commands in ATAN: verify, accept, and reject commands. In addition, there are
four types of user packets: probing (Mp), forwarding data (ME), replying data (MR), and
error packets (ME). For each error packet type, the information pattern to be recorded is
shown in Table 6.1.

TABLE 6.1 INFORMATION PATTERN FOR ERROR PACKETS [4]

The following assumptions are made.
1. The destination node is assumed to understand the ATA protocol in order to send
back the replying packets anonymously to the source node, but it may not necessarily
be an ATAN member.
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2. Before the data is inserted into the payload, a filter module must filter out anything
that can reveal the sender node's identity. The purpose is to ensure anonymous
communications in anonymous connections, as discussed in Reference [61].
However, this filtering is beyond the scope of this chapter since it vastly depends on
the application-layer protocol. Assume that such a filter has been executed earlier.

6.4.2 Cluster-based ATAN Network Management
All members in ATAN are divided into clusters, and each cluster is managed by the
cluster head. A cluster has an average value of the ATR values of all cluster members
(called an average ATR value) and a minimum ATR threshold to indicate the proper
range of the ATR value of each member that can stay in the cluster. Therefore, every one
in a cluster examines and controls each other such that the average ATR value of the
cluster remains unchanged or even improves. For the first-time user, a new user must join
the cluster that has the lowest average ATR value, by using the join procedure. When a
user receives a sufficiently high ATR value after having performed good-behaved
activities at least for a certain time period, that user may join another cluster that has the
higher average ATR value, by using the upgrade procedure; this is referred to as a
membership upgrade.
Two major benefits of such an upgrade are: first, user A can have a higher cluster
threshold ηC (A) to forward only messages originated by a user, say B, who holds the ATR
value satisfying y":

>ηC(A) ;

second, the packet originated by user A can be set a higher

Trust requirement T such that the intermediate node C, which meets the condition
yDC>T

, can forward the packet to the next hop D.
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For each cluster, the cluster key is used to encrypt all administrative packets, but
not data packets. These cluster-level administrative packets include the local query
packet, and the packet used in the voting protocol.
For the whole network, the group key is used to encrypt all administrative packets
transmitted among cluster heads. These group-level administrative packets are used when
the cluster heads update and exchange information about their clusters. This is illustrated
in Figure 6.3.

Cluster key : 4/3r-Cluster level communications : – –
Group key :
Group level communications : 4—
Figure 6.3. An illustration of communication levels in ATAN [4].
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There are two main protocols to perform network management in ATAN:
clustering protocol and voting protocol.

6.4.2.(1)

Clustering Protocol

The clustering protocol is to establish and manage the clusters with three procedures:
setup, merge, partition, and to manage the memberships with four procedures: join, leave,
upgrade, and downgrade.

1) Setup Procedure
The first cluster in ATAN is formed by the setup procedure as follows.
(Setup.1) A user announces itself as an interim cluster head to form the cluster. It
selects the parameters for the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem (such as g, p,
and Fp) and creates a one-time public key Rn c and a one-time public key
= gRnc (mod p) .
(Setup.2) These DH cryptosystem parameters along with information about the
sponsor, such as name, IP address, and email address, are signed with its
one-time public key [INFO] x pkn . The sponsor broadcasts this signed
c

information to other users as an invitation, denoted as
INVITATION[pk c x [INFO].
n

(Setup. 3) Each user in a group that wants to form the cluster creates a long-term
private key

and a long-term public key
kni = gXni (mod p) for Vi .

Each user broadcasts its public key.
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(Setup.4) The interim cluster head receives the public keys from all users,
authenticates each user, and creates a long-term private key X n and a
long-term public key

Note that although the user authentication is made before the user can
join ATAN, the authentication mechanism is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Some challenge handshake authentication (CHAP) protocols
such as Diffie Hellmand-based CHAP may be applied here. Then, the
cluster head creates the cluster key as

Since the interim cluster head's private key is kept secret, only the
cluster head can create the cluster key. The cluster head computes the
encrypting key corresponding to each user's public key (based on
E1Gamal cryptosystem) as

The cluster key and information about the cluster is encrypted with
this key ekZ and unicasts the message to all users.
(Setup. 5) Each user decrypts the message with the decrypting key

For two or more clusters, the group header, say n(1, L), is selected
among the cluster heads in a round robin manner. The group header only
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manages the group key to which all cluster heads contribute the share (the
public key). The group is set up based on the setup procedure. The group
key is computed as

2) Join Procedure
The join procedure is described below and illustrated in Figure 6.4. Some challenge
handshake authentication (CHAP) protocols such as Diffie Hellman-based CHAP can
be used to authenticate users.
(Join.1) A new user, says node n, sends the request to one or several cluster heads
that have the lowest average ATR value of cluster.
(Join. 2) The cluster head nc checks whether it can accept the request. If the
number of cluster members is less than the maximum (N < AlmAX ), the
request is preliminarily accepted; otherwise, rejected. Then, the cluster
head sends the invitation back to the user:
INVITATION [REQ ID, g, p, field Fp ].
If there are multiple invitations, the user may reply to the first
invitation that is received or wait for a certain period to collect the
invitations and determines to join which cluster and discards the others.
(Join. 3) Once the cluster is chosen, the new member , n( N+ 1, J), randomly selects
its private key and computes a public key Xn(N+i, j) denoted as
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and sends the request along with the public key to the chosen cluster head

nC(J)•
(Join.4.1) The cluster head authenticates the user (i.e., Diffie Hellman-Challenge
Handshake Authentication Protocol (DH-CHAP)).
(Join.4.2) When authentication is successful, the cluster head broadcasts the
suspension of the reciprocation of administrative packets (but not data
packets) to all cluster members and computes the new cluster key as
follows.

Let CKJ = (gΣXn(i,J)

r41-1}

(mod p) V i,i e Z be the current cluster key

before the new member, n(N+1, J), joins; the cluster head replaces its old
private key X ,1wnainthd(c1oe,mpujksj)y)X(ltr
key

(Join.4.3) The cluster head creates the encrypting key corresponding to the user's
public key:

(Join.4.4) The cluster head encrypts preliminary information about the current
cluster and the signed certificate with eknC(N+¹,J)

as
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x [INVITATION ID,NODE ID(n(N +1, j)|,
r

'j), [ATR_ DATABASE(cluster j)] ,CERT0+14)1

(Join.4.5) The key k n(N+1,J) is stored in the cluster head's public key database as the
user n(N+1, J)'s public key. The associated user information (NODE ID,
)

,j

nc(N+1 yn
timestamp)
is stored in the cluster head's ATR database.

(Join.4.6) The cluster head broadcasts the new cluster key, encrypted with the old
cluster key so that only the existing members, not the new member, can
decrypt and retrieve the new cluster key.
(Join.

5) The

new

member

computes

dknC(N+1,J)=(knN+1,J)XnC=gX„(, modp) toreivsuchinformation.

Figure 6.4 An illustration of the JOIN procedure [4].

the

decrypting

key
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3) Leave Procedure
There are three possible cases in the leave procedure:
3.1 An existing user, says node n(N, J), leaves ATAN. The cluster head periodically
detects the status of all cluster members every to (an update period). The cluster
head temporarily suspends the reciprocation of all administrative packets (but
not data packets) and computes the new cluster key as follows.
(a) Let CK =

(g

^

Xn(`'}

)

(mod p)

for Vi, i E

Z

{i} be the current cluster key;

the cluster head computes a new cluster key by subtracting the leaving
node n(N, J)'s public key from the current cluster key, and replacing its
old private key X n(1,j ) with the new key Xn(1,j) as

(b)

The new key is encrypted with the public key of all existing cluster
members, ekninC , that is stored in the cluster head's public key database.

(c)

The cluster head nc unicasts the encrypted new cluster key,
{[CK ] x

]} , to every cluster member.

3.2 The cluster head of cluster j leaves. The cluster members of this cluster j try to
contact their cluster head three times after losing contact with the cluster head.
If all contacts fail, any node (among those having the highest ATR value in the
cluster and staying in the cluster longer than any member), say n(2, J)),
becomes an interim cluster head. Every member deletes the old cluster head's
public key and profile off the public key and ATR databases. The interim
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cluster head creates a new pair of the public key and private key (

Xn( 2

„
,
)

2

and

kx.(2, ) and computes a temporary cluster key as
J)

Then, the interim cluster head calls for vote to select the new cluster head.
The ballot is encrypted with the temporary cluster key.
.3 A time period of the cluster head position expires; the cluster head notifies other
members and calls for vote to select the new cluster head. All cluster members
vote to select the new cluster head based upon the ATR value of all candidates
known to each cluster member.
•

Threat: A malicious interim cluster head may try to let some colluded

members to join. The solution is to check the list of all existing members during
the voting for selecting a new cluster head.
Once the new cluster head is selected, it broadcasts its public key to other
cluster heads. The group header computes the new group key as

and broadcasts it to existing cluster heads, encrypted with each cluster head's
public key.
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4) Merge Procedure
When two clusters try to merge together, there are three requirements that decide the
vote: the average ATR values of two clusters are in close range (i.e., 4 % difference);
the sum of the number of members in two clusters does not exceed the maximum
allowed; and the number of members in any cluster that have not yet stayed for at
least A lifecycle is less than s %. Note that 41, E, and A are decided by the
implementation.
The cluster heads of two clusters call for vote to merge. For the last two
requirements, corresponding information of two clusters are exchanged to help
deciding the vote. If the vote for merging fails, the cluster heads look for other
equivalent clusters; otherwise, announce the closure of the cluster. In this case, all
cluster members start the join procedure as if it is their first time.
If the vote is passed, two cluster heads integrate the ATR database entries; the
cluster head of the cluster that has a higher average ATR value becomes the new
cluster head of the merged cluster. This cluster head updates other cluster heads of
this merge operation.

5) Partition Procedure
When the number of members in a cluster reaches the maximum, the members vote to
select the would-be cluster head for the new cluster by using the voting for a cluster
head selection. Once the would-be cluster head is selected, the cluster head divides
the cluster J into two smaller clusters (J and L) with an equal number of cluster
members. The would-be cluster head becomes the cluster head of cluster L. The two
cluster heads update other cluster heads of this partition operation.
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6) Upgrade Procedure
Before the user can upgrade the cluster, the user is required to meet some
requirements: staying for at least A lifecycle in cluster J (to prevent a malicious
member from upgrading too fast), holding the ATR value that is greater or equal to
the average ATR value of cluster L, and the number of cluster members in cluster L
does not exceed the maximum.
A cluster member of cluster J with the ATR value greater than or equal to the
> yC(L) > y C(J)) follows the upgrade procedure

average ATR value of cluster L

which is similar to the Join procedure except:
•

In Step (Join.2), the user must provide the certificate issued by the cluster head of
cluster J in which the Start_Time, the beginning time that the user joins cluster J,
is recorded. The cluster head of cluster L calls for the vote to determine whether
or not the request is granted. The voting result binds to the decision from the
cluster head of cluster L.

•

In Step (Join.3), there can be multiple invitations from multiple clusters that hold
7 n(1 , J) >

Y

5

y

C(H)>J

n(I,J)CL

where yC(L) is in the same level as y C(H) . In addition, the user must leave cluster J
before Step ( Join. 4) begins.
The difference between the join and upgrade procedures is that the user in the join
procedure requests to join ATAN for the first time.
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7) Downgrade Procedure
If a member behaves maliciously until the ATR value drops below the minimum
ATR threshold (which will be discussed later), the cluster head calls for a vote. If the
vote is passed, the cluster head revokes its certificate and deletes its entry in
corresponding databases, and broadcasts to all cluster members as well as other
cluster heads.

6.4.2.(2)

Voting Protocol

The voting protocol in ATAN aims to enhance the clustering protocol's ability to resist
threats.
• Threat: If a cluster head has too much administrative power to control the cluster, an

ill-behaved cluster member will try to behave well until it becomes the cluster head
and then starts to inject malicious activities. The voting protocol can reduce such a
threat by sharing the responsibility of the cluster head among all cluster members.
The voting protocol is conducted as follows:
(Vote.1) The node who calls for the vote distributes the ballot indicating the reason

for the vote, requirements and corresponding information, and the result.
(Vote.2) A member casts the vote:

(a) to select a new cluster head, a voting member looks into its ATR
database and selects the member with the highest ATR value. The result
includes a certificate of the voter, node ID, and its associated ATR value.
(b) to merge the cluster, a voting member looks into its ATR database to
determine if the average ATR value requirement is met, and to check
information obtained from the other cluster heads if the last two
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requirements are met. The result includes a certificate of the voter and a
bit of 1 (yes) or 0 (no).
(c) to grant an upgrade, a voting member looks into its ATR database to
determine with respect to knowledge of the requesting node if this node
should be accepted to join. The result includes a certificate of the voter,
node ID and the number of recorded lifecycles of that member, and its
associated ATR value.
(d) to repel a member, a voting member looks into its ATR database to
determine if that member should leave the cluster. The result includes a
certificate of the voter, and node ID and associated ATR value of that
member.
(Vote. 3) The result is sent to the sponsor, encrypted with a cluster key.
(Vote. 4) The sponsor decrypts the encrypted vote, authenticates all voters, collects

the results from authenticated voters, and broadcasts the final result.
• Threat: If a sponsor node tries to alter the final result, any member can dispute the

vote. The sponsor must reveal necessary identification of every voter and its
associated result.
Note that the join procedure does not call for vote because there is only one
criterion: the number of members is less than the maximum.
6.4.3 Trust and Reputation System

In ATAN, an adaptive trust and reputation system is designed to evaluate the trust and
reputation values of every member such that the system encourages nodes to help
forwarding the packet, in return for an improvement of its ATR value known to other
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members. The packet generated from a node with a high ATR value is more desirable to
be forwarded by other nodes. The system is also designed to quickly force the abusing
members to retreat from the network by using an additive increment and multiplicative
decrement strategy. That is, the node will gradually gain a higher ATR value in an
additive manner when forwarding packets properly, but will sharply lose the ATR value
in a multiplicative manner when forwarding packets maliciously.
To implement the trust and reputation system, each member n(i, j) for
Vii e Z,Vj j E R stores the ATR database as illustrated in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 The Exemplary ATR Database of Node n(I, 1) [4]

NODE TYPE

ATR

Period of
Remaining
Average ATR
Timestamp
Lifecycle
Time
of cluster

There are six fields in the ATR database: node ID, type of node, ATR value,
average ATR value of the cluster, timestamp, lifecycle, and period of remaining time.
The type of node indicates whether this node is in the same cluster (cluster member or
cluster head) or out of the cluster (member). The timestamp t (i, j) indicates the last time
when the node n(i,

ATR value has been updated. The number of lifecycle indicates
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how long the node remains operating in the cluster. The period of the remaining time
t —r indicates the remaining time of cluster j before the new cluster head is selected.
The trust and reputation system consists of three processes: ATR query, ATR
update, and ATR evaluation. The ATR query process queries the ATR value. The ATR
evaluation process evaluates the ATR information obtained from the ATR query process
as well as from the probing and data forwarding processes. The ATR update process
updates the ATR database.

6.4.3.(1) ATR Query Process
When the path is being evaluated and the source node n(I, J) does not have the ATR
value of any forwarding intermediate node n(K, L) or the ATR value of the node is
expired, the source flags the node so the query process can be initiated immediately
(processing sequence number 5 in Figure 6.5) or wait until the data forwarding process
ends (processing sequence number 11 in Figure 6.5), depending on the delay sensitivity
of the application.

Figure 6.5 An illustration of various processes for data transmission in ATAN [4].
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There are two types of ATR query processes: local ATR query (LQ) and global
ATR query (GQ).
(a)

Local ATR query. In case that node n(I, J) wants to query the ATR value of the
target node n (K, L) K I, L J, node n(I, J) broadcasts the local query about
cluster L to other cluster members. All cluster members in cluster J,
e Z, L J,

themselves, yn(K, L
•

)

examines the ATR value of node n(K, L) known to

n(i,J) )|vi,i e Z, i =

I 5 and replies to node n(I, .1).

Threat: The local ATR query can be intercepted and altered. The solution is to

encrypt the local query with the cluster key to protect it from an adversary
who is not a cluster member. If the local ATR query is falsely given by a
cluster member, this is referred to as an insider attack, which will be discussed
in Section 6.8.
(b) Global ATR query. In case that node n(I, J) wants to obtain the ATR value of any
node outside the cluster, n(K, L), the global query is sent to the cluster head of
cluster L, n(C, L). The cluster member may send the query to the other members
(but not the target node) in cluster L as well.
•

Threat: The malicious insider (any ATAN member) can learn which cluster is

being sought and alter the result. To prevent this insider attack, the query is
encrypted by the querying node with the one-time-use query key.
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The querying node and the cluster head perform the six following steps:
(Query.1) The querying node randomly selects the one-time query secret key (Q, j,
)), and computes the query key

j

(Query.2) The querying node sends the query key along with the query information
as

(Query. 3) The cluster head authenticates the querying node from its certificate since
the public key of the cluster head of cluster J is known.
(Query. 4) If the querying node is successfully authenticated, the cluster head replies
to the querying node with the ATR value of all cluster members without
learning which cluster member is sought, randomly selects the secret key
corresponding to the query key, (Rn(1,L)), and computes two keys based on
the ELGamal cryptosystem:

(Query.5) The cluster head sends the replied information encrypted with the key
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(Query. 6) The querying node computes the decrypting key

to retrieve the ATR information
•

Threat: A malicious cluster head maliciously assigns a high ATR value to some
cluster members, particularly if those nodes are its collaborators. If the increase is not
steep, the layered trust hierarchy bounds the ATR value of all cluster members to be
closely such that this threat is negligible. If the increase is significant, the different
threshold strategy used to evaluate the ATR value, which will be discussed shortly,
rejects such an increase.

•

Threat: An adversary can impersonate and modify the reply. The problem can be
alleviated by enforcing the cluster head to sign this reply with its certificate such that
the replying message is protected and the cluster head cannot repudiate its message.

6.4.3.(2) ATR Evaluation Process
It requires three information processes - querying, probing, and data forwarding - to
conduct the ATR evaluation.
From the querying process, the mean of ATR values of n(K, L), obtained from all
queried nodes, will be considered as the reputation value of n(K, L) known to the
querying node n(I, J) because this ATR value is experienced by other nodes, not by node
n(I, J).
From the probing and forwarding processes, the mean of ATR values of the
forwarding node n(K, L), retrieved from all digests written by all forwarding intermediate

5
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nodes, will be considered as the trust value of n(K, L) known to n(I, J) because this ATR
value is learned by node n(I, J).
Let Q ={(1,1),...,(N,M)} be the set of queried nodes which respond to the ATR
query from both local query and global query packets, and B ={(1,1),. ..,(N,M)} be the set
of forwarding nodes which mark their ATR values in each digest.
Upon receiving the query packet, the source, node n(I, J), initiates the ATR
evaluation process as follows:
(Query Eval. 1) For both local query and global query, node n(I, J) computes the ATR

value of n(K, L) from a queried node n(a, b) as

(Query_Eval.2) Node n(I, J) computes the weighted mean of the ATR value of n(K, L)

from all queried nodes of the same cluster b:

where be z
(Query Eval. 3) To further improve the reputation value, node n(I, J) multiplies this
7" bn(r j )

with the average ATR value of cluster b obtained from n(I,

J)'s ATR database

,n(1 J) ••
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(Query _Eval . 4) The outputs from all clusters are summed, and the weighted mean is
calculated as the reputation value of node n(K, L) known to node n(I,
n(K, L)
A µn(I , J) :

Similarly, upon receiving the probing and data forwarding packets, the source,
node n(I, J), initiates the ATR evaluation process as follows:
(Prob_Eval. I)

Node n(I, J) computes the ATR value of n(K, L) from the forwarding
node n(c, d), where (c, d)eB

(Prob Eva 2)

:

The outputs from all forwarding nodes n(c, d) of the same cluster are
summed, and node n(I, J) computes the weighted mean:

(ProbEval.3)

To further improve the trust value, node n(I, J) multiplies this y'" n(1
with the average ATR value of cluster b obtained from the n(I, J)'s
ATR database , ydn(I,J

):
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(Prob Eval.4)

The outputs from all clusters are summed, and the weighted mean is
calculated as the trust value of node n(K, L) known to node n(I, J),

The new ATR value of node n(K, L) known to node n(I, J) can be computed as
(1)
where a, /3 are the weight factors of the trust value and reputation value evaluated at each
node, respectively, where a >/3 >0, and a + /3=1.
To limit the querying time, node n(I, J) must obtain the new ATR value of node
n(K, L) from these queries before the query timeout (tQ) expires.

6.4.3.(3)

ATR Update Process

After computing the ATR value, the system computes a ratio between the new ATR
value ( yn(K, L)

n(I, J))

) and the ATR value ( yn(K, L)

n(I, J))

) obtained from the ATR database. The ratio

must be less than the difference threshold e, defined in Equation 2, in order to accept the
change

update, implying that yn(K, L) n(I,J) y(K,L) n(I,J) ; otherwise, the ATR update is dismissed.

(2)
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The ratio is used to prevent an update of a fake reputation value received from the
ATR query process. Then, the output y"

bn(I,

J

)

is recorded as the average ATR value of

cluster b known to node n(I, J),
"b
r n(I, J)

1,

change

b
Y n(I , J) •

If the new ATR value of node n(K, L) known to node n(I, J) is below the
minimum ATR threshold ( p), the node n(I, J) broadcasts to other cluster members of this
untrustworthy n(K, L). Those cluster members update the ATR value of node n(K, L)
known to them. Later, when node n(K, L) initiates the probing process and wants any
node in the cluster J to help forwarding its packets, such a request is rejected. Finally, the
node with ATR value lower than the minimum ATR value is forced to retreat from the
network because it will be ignored by other nodes. That is, no packet is being forwarded
to this node and no other node forwards its packets.
• Threat: The malicious cluster member n(I, J) can try to dump the ATR value of n(K,
L) known to other cluster members such that the new ATR value of n(K, L) is
severely decreased or below p. This problem is referred to as an insider attack, which
will be discussed shortly.

6.4.4 Transmission Processes
In each transmission session, the source node first initiates the probing process to obtain
crucial information from intermediate nodes to establish the path. Once such information
is retrieved and the path is successfully evaluated, the source node then begins the data
forwarding process to securely transmit the packets. After the destination node receives
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the packets, the replying process starts, and the reply packets are traversed through
ATAN to the source node anonymously. Various processes for data transmission in
ATAN are illustrated in Figure 6.5.
All packets traversed in ATAN have virtually the same format, which consists of

kS

9 fields: encrypted destination node's address, treruqsSceqoiumne,,c
number, no-hop option, no-hash option, cluster ID, digests, and payload, as shown in
Figure 6.6, except that the data packet and reply packet do not need k,
padding can be filled.

Figure 6.6 The packet format in ATAN [4].

rce

and the
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6.4.4.(1)

Probing Process

The source node ns randomly selects a sequence number Seq and a session secret key,
Sns and computes the session public key as

At the beginning, the source sends out a probing packet without a given
destination node. The Trust requirement (7) is defined as:

The Trust requirement depends on the ATR value of the source node and the
average ATR value of the cluster to which the source node belongs. The ideas behind
include the following: the Trust requirement determines the potential intermediate node
during the ATR database lookup process. The source's packets will be forwarded by the
intermediate node that has an ATR value equal to or lower than the Trust requirement.
Thus, the trustworthiness of the path is improved and pre-determined. The probing
process is described below and is illustrated in Figure 6.7.
(Prob.1) A current node (source or sender) n (i, j) performs the ATR database lookup

algorithm is to verify which next intermediate node n(k,l) has the ATR value
higher than Trust requirement (T).
a). If the Trust requirement condition fails and the no-hop option bit is zero
(unset), the packet rejection algorithm with a reason of "no next hop",
and notifies the source node with the error packet in Step (Prob.4).
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b).

If the Trust requirement condition fails but the no-hop option bit is one
(set), the node n (i, j) decreases the Trust requirement. This step is
repeated until either the Trust requirement drops below half (proceed to
Step 4) or the next intermediate node n(k,l) is found (proceed to Step
(Prob.1.(c)).

c).

If the Trust requirement condition is met, the node performs the packet
accept algorithm in Step (Prob. 7).

(Prob.2) The intermediate node n (k, l) performs the repetition check algorithm to

check the repetition of the sequence number of both the previously received
probing packets and the corresponding session public keys.
a)

If both conditions are met, the intermediate node performs the packet
rejection algorithm with the reason of "repeated packet", and notifies
both the source node and the predecessor, who sent the two probing
packets, using the error packet in Step (Prob. 4).

b) If any condition fails, the intermediate node continues to Step (Prob.3).
(Prob.3) The intermediate node n(k,l) computes two keys: kSeq n(k,l) and pkSeq n(k,l)

corresponding to the sequence number, and stores the source node's session
public key kSeqns in the session key database for a period of time, r . In
addition, the intermediate node performs the sender check algorithm on the
probing packet received to verify whether the sender node has the ATR value
higher than the ATR threshold of the cluster /, y C(l) , to which the
intermediate node belongs.
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a)

If failed, the intermediate node notifies the source node with the reason
of "bad sender" by the error packet in Step (Prob.4).

b)

If passed, the intermediate node records some information about itself
onto the available digest in the probing packet in Step (Prob.5).

(Prob. 4) The intermediate node n (k, l) performs the packet rejection algorithm, which
rejects the probing packet with one of the following reasons, "no next hop",
"repeated packet", or "bad sender". It provides some crucial information
(called a digest) encrypted with the source node's session public key that
came with the probing packet and replies to the source node.
(Prob.5) The intermediate node n(k,l) performs the ATR database lookup algorithm,
as in Anonymity bibliography [57], to verify which intermediate node has the
ATR value higher than the Trust requirement. In this illustration, the selected
node will become the next intermediate node n (m, n)
(Prob. 6) The intermediate node n(k,l) checks whether the no-hash option bit is set
a)

If the no-hash option bit is one (set), the intermediate node skip to Step
(Prob. 7).

b)

If the no-hash option bit is zero (unset), the intermediate node computes
the hash function based on the SHA-1 scheme on the payload as
H (Payload) .

(Prob. 7) The intermediate node n (k, l) performs the packet accept algorithm to write
crucial information into the available digest.
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In the packet acceptance algorithm, the intermediate node generates a
random number S for S __SMAX and overwrites S consecutive digests with
copies of encrypted crucial information.
(Prob.8) Steps (Prob.2 Prob. 7) are repeated until all digests in the probing packet are
-

filled. The last node initiates the replying phase and sends back the probing
packet to the source

I

Packet acceptance

(7)

Sender check

(.3)

AIR database lookup

Repetition check

(2)

(5)

ATR database lookup

(1)

ALGORITHMS & COMMANDS

C`■

Figure 6.7 The forwarding steps in the probing process [4].
01
1
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The no-hop option bit is inspected when the ATR database lookup process does
not find an intermediate node which matches the Trust requirement. If the no-hop option
bit is set off (by default), the packet is rejected and the error packet with the reason of "no
next hop" is sent back to the source and the packet is dropped. If the no-hop option bit is
set to one, the packet is forwarded to the node with the lower ATR value closest to the
Trust requirement, but not less than, say, a half of the Trust requirement; otherwise, the
error packet is sent and the packet is dropped as well.
To prevent the repetition of forwarding the packet twice, the intermediate node
checks the sequence number of the received packet. Since the source node's
identification is not placed in the probing packet, there might be a chance that multiple
source nodes randomly select the same sequence number. Thus, the receiving
intermediate node also checks the session public key. In case that two probing packets are
generated from the same source node, they will have the same sequence number and the
same session public key. Then, the receiving intermediate node accepts one probing
packet, and rejects the other. The replayed packets can be dropped.
Each intermediate node provides information and places in the digest that
includes a signed hash of the ATAN header and optional payload, a certificate of the
current node, a current node ID, a previous node ID, a next node ID, their corresponding
ATR values, an average ATR value of the cluster to which these three nodes belong, time
stamp, and keys (only in reply to the probing packet).
• Threat: An adversary may alter the ATAN header such that next intermediate nodes
unintentionally mistreat the packet. The digest is signed along with its certificate to
protect the content.
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The intermediate node n(k, l) also randomly selects a secret key

Rn(k,l)

corresponding to the sequence number and source node's session key, and computes two
associated keys based on the ELGamal cryptosystem:

Ls

Only

the

keys

k /nw,RaSe)'islbeql(kopt)dyh,

database for a period of r. These keys will later be used by the intermediate node to
encrypt the destination node's address in the data packet if this intermediate node is
selected as the last receiver node. All this information in the digest will be encrypted with

The intermediate node then records the following pair into the digest, denoted as

To ensure that the source can detect if the intermediate node has modified the payload, a
payload is hashed by using a hash function. However, the hashed payload can incur a
huge overhead; the source node may set the no hash option bit, so that the intermediate
-

node is not required to hash the payload. Anonymity is supposed to be higher if the nohash option bit is unset and the no-hop option bit is set. However, the throughput of
ATAN is expected to be higher if the no-hash option bit is set and the no-hop option bit is
set.
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Upon the receipt of the probing packet, the source node decrypts all digests and
extracts information by computing the decrypting key

and decrypting all encrypted digests as

The source node evaluates information retrieved from the digest to justify whether
the probing packet has been forwarded properly and honestly.

6.4.4.(2)

Path Evaluation Process

To evaluate the path from the digests, the scores-based scheme is proposed. Let W be the
set of all criteria defined by the source node, Y the set of criteria met by the intermediate
node, and 8 the score assigned to each criterion v, where

E θ = 1.
v

veW

The trustworthiness of the i th intermediate node (Ψi) is one if the sum of the met
criteria exceeds the acceptance threshold (6), and zero otherwise. That is,
{1, if
=

Σθ

v

veY

(3)

0, else
Therefore, the source node can select which intermediate node is selected, as well as at
which sequence, along the forwarding path.
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A sample of the set of criteria and scores are illustrated in Table 5.3, but the
importance and appropriateness of criteria and corresponding scores are left to be
discussed in the future work.
6.4.4.(3) Data Forwarding Process

After the source node selects the intermediate nodes along the path, the last selected
intermediate node becomes the last receiver node (nL). Then, the source node encrypts
each individual intermediate node ID (says node n(m, n)) with its predecessor's session
key (says node n(k, 1)) as

and writes into the digest corresponding to the node n(k, l). This is similar to the onion
routing method [66], [69], [71]; the only difference is that in ATAN each intermediate
node's session key is obtained via a probing packet for a particular session. This can
enhance secrecy of the session key.
In ATAN, all intermediate nodes' session keys are kept in the source's session
key database in which each intermediate node keeps its secret session key (i.e., R n(k,l) and
the source's session key (

kSeqns
KSeqns

) used for this source node per session.

The source node sends out the data packets in one session through the selected
path to the destination node. If the source node does not initiate the data forwarding
process or the data forwarding packet fails to reach the last receiver node before the time
period r expires, the last receiver node's symmetric session key is discarded, thereby
terminating the data packet transmission.
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Like the forwarding steps of the probing process, any intermediate node in the
data forwarding process performs all steps 1-8 (in Figure 5.7), except Step (Prob.5),
which is refined as:
(Forward.5)

Node n(k, l) sorts the session key database, for the sequence number
and knSeqns , and then computes A

tpokdSeecqrypn(h,l)asigt

n(,

to reveal which is the next intermediate node, denoted as

The selected node with nD_address will become the next intermediate node n(m,
n).

Table 6.3 The Sample Set of Criteria and Scores [4]

Criterion (v)
Report a "no-next-hop" error

Score
0.0625

Report a "bad-predecessor" error

0

Report a "repeated-sequence-number" error

0

Being reported as a bad sender by the predecessor

0.0625

Being reported as a sender with "repeated-sequence-number" error

0.125

by the predecessor
Any header filed is modified
A payload is modified

0.125
0.5
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6.4.4.(4)

Performance Evaluation Process

At the end of a session, all digests from all packets, including error packets if any, are
collected and the performance is evaluated. The path evaluation process is utilized. If the
trustworthiness of each intermediate node exceeds the acceptance threshold, the ATR
value of that node known to the source is updated based on the additive increment and
multiplicative decrement (AIMD) algorithm [77].
The new ATR value of node n(K, L) known to the source n(I, J) is calculated as:

(4)
where I > 0 is the additive increment factor, and D > 1 is the multiplicative decrement
factor.
•

If the node is trustworthy, D = 1 and I> 0.

•

If the node is not trustworthy, any positive D > 1 and I = 0
Note that this new ATR value (from Equation 4) is not subject to the ratio test in

Equation 2 in Subsection 6.4.3.(3). For example, I = 1 and D = 2.
This AIMD strategy ensures that the untrustworthy node's ATR value is rapidly
decreased (multiplicative decrease) and the trustworthy node's ATR value is gradually
increased (additive increase). The ATR evaluation is also applied to the error packet to
adjust the ATR value of the maliciously acting node.
By helping forward the packets for the source, the intermediate node improves its
ATR value known to the source. Later, all cluster members in the cluster to which the
source belongs will do the local query to the source and then properly adjust the
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intermediate node's ATR value known to them. Accordingly, the future packets from this
intermediate node will be accepted and forwarded by these cluster members.
• Threat: The source may improperly update or ignore to update the ATR value of the

trustworthy intermediate node. After the session ends, the intermediate node can
execute the global ATR query to check if the ATR value has been updated, which can
be indicated by the timestamp.
6.4.4.(5)

Replying Process

The replying process is initiated when there is a packet to be sent back to the source node,
which includes the probing, global, error and reply packets. There are two possible
solutions in replying: one using the same forwarding path, and the other using the cluster
ID. Many existing anonymous schemes use the reply block to contain the replying
address of the source based on the onion routing [69]-[72]. However, this requires an
extra space in the packet.
In ATAN, the replying path is simply routed through any intermediate nodes by
using the cluster ID. The replying packet is forwarded among intermediate nodes until it
reaches any cluster member associated with the cluster ID. That cluster member then
broadcasts to other cluster members. Only the source can decrypt the payload. Although
the cluster ID is very simple and decreases the space in the packet, the communication
overhead increases from the multicast of the replying packet. Another disadvantage is
that the adversary, which can either be a malicious destination or any insider or any
outsider, can track the reply packet to the cluster to which the source belongs, though not
exactly to the source node.
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6.5

Threat Models

Here, the effectiveness of ATAN is analyzed and monitored when being deployed against
the existing prevalent attacks.
1. Collusion attack
Two or more adversaries can collaborate with each other in several ways such as 1) by
sharing information of all active nodes obtained such that all nodes in ATAN are under
monitored, 2) by coverting the attacks from the user who attempts to detect any malicious
activities, and 3) by organizing the attacking tasks such that the computation capability of
the group of attackers is greatly exacerbated. ATAN may not sustain this attack if the
group of attackers launches a correlation attack onto every member in a cluster to which
the reply packet is sent (the cluster ID is openly known). One possible solution is to
encrypt the cluster ID in layers but that may incur a huge packet size. The defense against
such an attack will be more elaborated in the future.
2. Insider attack
The adversary can be either an insider from the same cluster or an insider from other
clusters.
•

If a cluster head has an administrative power to effectively control the cluster, a
malicious cluster member may try to become a cluster head and operate the
cluster with an ill intention. A voting protocol is proposed to reduce the
administrative power held by the cluster head. A responsibility of some important
incidents in the cluster is shared among members.

•

A malicious cluster head may fake the ATR value of the target node during a
global query process. A possible solution is to have the other cluster member of
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the cluster to which the target node belongs queried to confirm whether the cluster
head has given the ATR value correctly.
•

A malicious cluster member (during local query and global query processes) may
try to fake the ATR value of the target node. Three proposed solutions are: first,
the ATR value of the target known to the source (querying node) is computed
from the ATR value of the target known to the queried node, the ATR value of
the queried node known to the source, and the average ATR value of the cluster to
which the target belongs. Thus, the ATR value given by the malicious member is
not directly used. Second, the weight factor for the reputation value is used to
decrease the given ATR value. Third, the difference threshold is used to cancel an
ATR update when there is a significant difference between the new ATR value
and the stored one.

3. Traffic analysis attack
This type of attack can be divided into several types:
•

Timing correlation attack. If the processing time of a particular intermediate node
can be accurately estimated, the attacker can correlate two packets coming in and
going out of that node. In ATAN, the forwarding steps in the probing and data
forwarding processes require different computation timing, and therefore, ATAN
effectively prevents this attack.

•

Packet indistinguishability. If the data packet and the reply packet have different
formats and have different sizes, the attacker can distinguish the type of packet
and the direction of transmission. Since ATAN uses the virtually similar format
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for each packet both in the forwarding and reversing paths, ATAN offers a
minimal chance of being instigated by such an attack.
4. Logging attack
The malicious intermediate node keeps records of communication for every session that it
helps forwarding. If the two end nodes continue their communication with more than one
session, they will appear more often in the records than other nodes. Thus, the two nodes
are likely linked as a source-destination pair, thus potentially exposing the anonymity. In
ATAN, probing packets in different sessions are independently routed based on the
varying Trust requirements. All intermediate nodes are also independently selected based
on the varying ATR values. Thus, the same intermediate node may not likely be picked
for the same source-destination pair, thus mitigating the threat of such an attack.
5. Denial of service (DoS) attack
ATAN executes the encryption and decryption based on the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem
at every intermediate node for every data packet. That may allow the malicious insider
the best chance to launch the DoS attack by sending a load of normal or malicious
packets onto trustworthy nodes. As a result, the trustworthy node's CPU and memory are
fully exhausted. In this example, only colluded attackers can still operate so users are
forced to send packets through a group of attackers. Thus, ATAN is likely susceptible to
the DoS attack. By far, solutions using access control to limit the access and efficiently
control the resource utilization may mitigate such attack.
6. Replay attack
An attacker sends a large number of packets that have been previously forwarded to the
intermediate node in order to flood the node's memory to instigate the traffic analysis
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attack (only one legitimate packet is in the memory and the rest are the replayed packets
such that the packet is easily correlated). An attacker can also send a replayed packet to
cause different results that may exploit the procedure's vulnerability. However, ATAN
uses both sequence number and timestamp to effectively eliminate this replay attack.

6.6 Network Analysis

Since ATAN requires much information to be carried in the packet, one metric to
evaluate the performance is the size of the management portion compared with the data
payload portion. As illustrated in Figure 6.5, the probing packet carries destination
address (32 bits), source's session key (128-1024 bits, 512 bits in this example), trust (8
bits), sequence number (16 bits), no-hop option (1 bit), no-hash option (1 bit), B digests,
and varying payload. Each digest consists of a hashed header (160 bits — SHA1 output),
one cluster ID, three node_ID, three ATR value (each 8 bits), and time stamp (32 bits).
Consider N members in each cluster and M clusters in ATAN. Let X be the
number of bits representing the cluster member ID, and Y representing the cluster ID.
Thus, X=log2N and Y=log2M. Therefore, each digest is (200+3X+Y)-bit long and the
ATAN header in the probing packet has 570 + B(200+3X+Y) bits. Since the probing
packet does not need to carry any payload, the size of the probing packet can be rather
small. Similarly, there are 58 + B(200+3X+Y) bits in the ATAN header of the other three
packet types. If there are 50 members in one cluster, 5 clusters in ATAN, and B is limited
to 5, then the ATAN header of data packet is approximately 145 bytes. If the core
network is Ethernet, the size of the maximum transmission unit (MTU) is 1500 bytes.
Then, the ratio of the ATAN header and data payload is around 0.1, which is relatively
small.
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6.7 Conclusion
The loosely decentralized network management in ATAN does not require a central
authority and knowledge of the whole network topology. This chapter demonstrates the
deployability of ATAN in a decentralized network based on the trust and reputation
model. The user joins the cluster based on its ATR value and the average ATR value of
that cluster. The voting scheme is used to share the responsibility of managing the cluster
among cluster members.
The trust and reputation system is designed to gradually increase the ATR value
for a successful transmission but to sharply decrease the ATR value if a node acts
maliciously. The probing packet obtains the candidate path and is used by the source to
examine each intermediate node's trustworthiness. The source can choose the
intermediate nodes of ATAN to help forward the packets. The intermediate node in turn
inspects the source's trustworthiness to determine whether to help the source forward the
packet.
This chapter has provided the framework for deploying ATAN, and future works
include simulating ATAN by using a network simulator, network performance analysis,
and a methodology for assigning the scores for each criterion (Table 6.3).

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This dissertation has presented fundamental attributes for evaluating mechanisms in
providing one or more security services for GCSs as well as additional properties
corresponding to those supported security services in Chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, this
dissertation has presented known attacks that can severely disrupt or even shut down
group communications in wired and wireless networks, and has presented necessary
security requirements, and illustrated fundamental security services to meet these
requirements and safeguard the communications against these attacks. It was
demonstrated that several attacks can be prevented and mitigated by proposed security
services. To complete the survey on SGC over wired and wireless networks, some open
challenges that still need to be overcome are presented.
This dissertation has also incorporated ECC into GKM to decrease the key length
while providing the same security level as that of other cryptosystems, and has adapted
the cluster based key management scheme to make the ECC-GKM scheme more
efficient. The group is separated into several clusters, which are independent from each
other, particularly in the operations of key management. The cluster key is used to secure
the group key selection and distribution while the group key is used to encrypt broadcast
messages. When there is a membership change, the corresponding cluster key and the
group key are changed in order to protect their secrecies. The periodic rekeying operation
also strengthens the key secrecies.
The future work will provide extensive analysis on network performance (i.e.,
latency, bandwidth utilization, and throughput) and compare its performance against
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other public key cryptosystems.
This dissertation has also demonstrated the deployability of ATAN in a
decentralized network based on the trust and reputation model. The user joins the cluster
based on its ATR value and the average ATR value of that cluster. The voting scheme is
used to share the responsibility of managing the cluster among cluster members. The trust
and reputation system is designed to gradually increase the ATR value for a successful
transmission but to sharply decrease the ATR value if a node acts maliciously. The
probing packet obtains the candidate path and is used by the source to examine each
intermediate node's trustworthiness. The source can choose the intermediate nodes of
ATAN to help forward the packets. The intermediate node in turn inspects the source's
trustworthiness to determine whether to help the source forward the packet.
This chapter has provided the framework for deploying ATAN, and future works
include simulating ATAN by using a network simulator, network performance analysis,
and a methodology for assigning the scores for each criterion. Moreover, trust and
reputation model will be modified such that network performance in terms of overheads
can be improved. Security analysis will also be performed to demonstrate the
effectiveness of incorporating trust and reputation into group communications systems.

APPENDIX
THE PROBABILITY MODEL

Following [78], the Beta probability distribution can be used to estimate some important
features in this dissertation that may prevent or mitigate the impact from the attacks as
follows:
1.

The probability of the successful transaction at the next session in which node Y is
part of the forwarding path.

Let n be the number of unsuccessful transactions originated from node X and
forwarded by node Yin the past sessions,
p be the number of successful transactions originated from node X and forwarded

by node Yin the past sessions,
0 be the true proportion of number of successful transactions for nodes
X and Y,

9 be the estimate for 0 based on all past transactions originated from node X and
forwarded by node Y.
Based on the Beta probability distribution, the prior probability distribution of 9,
the probability distribution that represents a belief about an unknown quantity ö before
any observation results are recorded, is defined as
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where 0 0 1 and c,, c 2 > 0 . The Beta function can be defined by using the Gamma
function as follows:

The above equations are proven in Reference [78].
Assume that the probability of each transaction is independent of other
transactions originated from node X and forwarded by node Y, and let D be the set of all
transactions for the past sessions originated from node X and forwarded by node Y, and
let TrXY , (S,) be the variable representing a transaction for the ith session originated from
node X and forwarded by node Y. Thus,

If the transaction originated from node X and forwarded by node Y in the ith
session is successful, TrXY, (S,) =1, otherwise TrXY, (S) = 0 as follows:

Let L(.) be the likelihood of having p successful transactions and n unsuccessful
transactions; then, from the Beta probability distribution theory,

This likelihood is calculated, given the estimator ö , based on the assurance that the
random variable p follows a binomial distribution as follows:
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From the Bayes's theorem, the posterior probability distribution can be derived
from the normalization of the prior probability distribution (or a normalizing constant)
multiplied by the likelihood.
From the Bayes's theorem, with n and p fixed, and the prior distribution being
Beta distribution P (6) = Beta(c1,c2 ), the posterior probability can be derived as

That means the posterior is also a beta distribution Beta(C1+c 1 ,C2+c 2 ).
Therefore, the posterior probability distribution is derived as follows:

where 0 e [0,1].
The integral in the denominator can be solved to get the posterior in a convenient
form as proven in Reference [78].
Since it is already known that if Pr (d) is a Beta probability distribution with C1
and C2, one can assume that the posterior is also a Beta distribution with parameters

p+C1 ,n+ C2 . That means,
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From the Beta probability distribution, the expected value and variance of
Beta (C1 , C2 ) are

respectively.
Thus, the expected value and variance of Beta (p + C1 , n + C2 ) are

Note that from the Law of the Total Probability, the prior probability of d is equal
to the prior expected value of the posterior probability of O. Thus, for any random
variable, p,

where Pr (θ| p)is the conditional probability of 6 given p.
One can estimate the parameters C1 and

C2

Therefore, the parameters C1 and

can be derived in the same way. These

parameters change as the transaction grows.

C2

as follows:
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Reference [78] has proven that to determine the estimate of the probability that
the next transaction is successful in which node X originates and node Y forwards, based
on given past records of n+p sessions, one can derive Pr (TrSi+1XY = (TrSi+1 XY = 11D) as follows:

where

θn+p p

is the estimated successful proportion based on n+p previous transactions.

Pr (TrSi+1 XY =11d
B p9 D) is the likelihood for TrSi+¹ XY =1 given the estimated θn+p from n+p
previous transactions.
Therefore, the probability of the successful transaction at the next session in
which node Y is part of the forwarding path can be calculated from

2.

The probability of the true recommendation at the next request in which node Y
would reply the trustworthiness request sent by node X regarding a node of
interest Z.

Let n be the number of false recommendations sent by node X and replied by node Y
regarding node Z's reputation in the past requests,
p be the number of true recommendations sent by node X and replied by node Y

regarding node Z's reputation in the past requests,
0 be the true proportion of number of true recommendations between nodes
X and Y regarding the node of interest Z,
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B be the estimate for 0 based on all past recommendations sent by node X and
replied by node Y regarding node Z's reputation.
Assume that the probability of each recommendation is independent of other
recommendations sent by node X and replied by node Y regarding the node of interest Z,
and let G be the set of all recommendations for the past sessions between nodes X and Y,
and let TrXY|Z (S ) be the variable representing a recommendation for the ith request sent
by node X and replied by node Y regarding the node of interest Z. Thus,

If the recommendation replied at the ith request is true, TrXY|Z (S,) =1, otherwise

TrXY|Z (S ) = 0 as follows:

Therefore, using the same probability model as discussed earlier, the probability
of the true recommendation replied by node Y at the next request can be calculated from
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